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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring 
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or 
email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes an effort to limit the environmental 
footprint of reports by publishing all of our research reports online. This report is 
available online. 
Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing 
mined areas, and assisting affected communities.
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation 
by all, including:
  No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel 
landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
  Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
  More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW);
  Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.







LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict. 
Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines 
are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers 
the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict 
against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason 
fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive 
items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used 
during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. 
ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, 
but not mines. 
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons 
can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and 
surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their 
daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom 
of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in 
mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When 
land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to 
landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than 
paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, 
but that they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
ii 
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel 
mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their 
jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so 
must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families 
and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine 
incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments 
to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely 
without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded 
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines 
or ERW presence for decades to come.
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and 
internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of 
working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, 
Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human 
Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations 
witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with 
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even 
prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive 
solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a 
complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience 
of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors 
they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and 
medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who 
spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty 
banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine 
problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them 
to be effective advocates in their respective countries.   
Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage 
their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today 
there are campaigns in some 100 countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. 
It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty 
became a reality. 
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days 
of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel 






mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join 
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the 
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, 
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries 
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state 
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 
which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This 
includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all 
aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective 
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become 
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and 
the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States 
Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response 
to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together 
in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament 
treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into 
practice the concept of civil society-based verification.
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine 
Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, 
the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition 
issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and 
Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-
CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate 
publications.
The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is 
an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have 
taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through 
extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although 
in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send 
researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements the transparency reporting by states required under 
international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual 
collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, 
cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for 
independent reporting and evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and 
ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, 
cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information 
about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
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The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report.  A network 
of more than two dozen researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered information to 
prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions 
and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research 
institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is 
limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that 
is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections 
from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 19th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster 
Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2016 provides 
a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries 
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also 
includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support 
for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2015, with information included up to 
November 2016 when possible.
IN MEMORIAM DR. ROBERT MTONGA
Dr. Robert “Bob” Mtonga, member of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC passed away 
in March 2017. A long-time researcher for the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Dr 
Mtonga tirelessly championed the ban on landmines and cluster munitions throughout Africa 
and beyond. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor team wishes to pay tribute to him 
and acknowledge the important contributions he has made to a world free of landmines and 
cluster munitions.







A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It 
was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support 
of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The 
Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank 
the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, 
and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC 
staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, 
distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research 
Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of four 
NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s 
members include: Danish Demining Group (Richard MacCormac), Handicap International 
(Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Mines Action Canada (Paul 
Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer 
(ICBL-CMC acting director), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). From January to 
November 2017, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, 
and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2017. The Editorial Team included:
  Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-
Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham, with assistance from Jacob Ware;
  Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie 
Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
  Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Éléa Boureux, Clémence 
Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore, Jennifer Reeves, and Marianne Schulze, with 
appreciation to Erin Hunt for research in 2016 that contributed to this report.
The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.
mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on 
survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with 
the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
 Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2017 with 
assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant) and Arsen Markarov (intern). 
Report formatting was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Nimmerrichter - XEST printed the 
report in Austria. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
  Government of Australia
  Government of France
  Government of Germany
  Government of Luxembourg
  Government of Norway
  Government of Sweden
  Government of Switzerland
  Government of the United States of America**
  Holy See 
  UNICEF
  UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, 
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the 
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating 
organizations.
* List accurate as of November 2017. 
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CHA confirmed hazardous area
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UN United Nations
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Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used 
during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is 
included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty 
through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and 
ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level 
of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment 
of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means 
a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or 
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means 
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine 
designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected 
hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates 
that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine 
clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine 
clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining 
equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected 
hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed 
not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous 
areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through 
direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all 
specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster 
munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive 
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” 
Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or 
air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) 
over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or 
both.  
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Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination 
has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, 
including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, 
recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device 
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine 
Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.  
Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – 
An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety 
and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some 
cases, defining international requirements and specifications.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and 
remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-
technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, 
normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action 
centers also implement mine action activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines 
and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public 
information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.
Non-state armed groups (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed 
groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a 
broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy 
forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use 
of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding 
environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW 
contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization 
and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey 
activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from 
central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected 
area. 
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW 
contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous 
area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk 
remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 






















Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition 
(cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” 
although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.” 
Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, 
submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/
ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may 
include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface 
search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as 
intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that 
were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate. 
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her 
family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and 
needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public 
policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their 
families, and communities in society.
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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Table Key
States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of  
November 2017
Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 
November 2017
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Twenty years after the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and signed, it continues to be a 
tremendous life-saving success. Landmine Monitor 2017 details progress toward the goal of 
a mine-free world, with 162 countries implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and most of the 35 
countries that remain outside it nonetheless abiding by its key provisions. A small number 
of states and non-state armed groups use antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines, 
which contributed to a very high number of casualties recorded in 2016. Many countries 
continue to clear mine contamination, and international funding for mine action increased 
in 2016. However, very few States Parties appear to be on track to meet clearance deadlines, 
and support to victims remains inadequate. 
USE
From October 2016 through October 2017, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of 
antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Myanmar and Syria, neither of which are 
party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
  Antipersonnel mines have been used by government forces of Myanmar throughout 
the past 20 years and by government forces of Syria since 2012.
  There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties 
to the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period.
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least nine countries, 
including States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
  There was no new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Colombia for the first 
time since Landmine Monitor began publishing in 1999.
  The extensive use of improvised mines by the Islamic State has resulted in new 
casualties and contamination. 
CASUALTIES
2016 was the second year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of people recorded as 
killed or injured by landmines—including improvised types that mostly act as antipersonnel 
mines, cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).
2 
  In 2016, the Monitor recorded 8,605 mine/ERW casualties, of which at least 2,089 
people were killed.
  The high total was mostly due to casualties recorded in armed conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, and Yemen. Accurate data gathering for active conflicts, 
however, remains challenging. 
  Following a sharp increase in 2015, the casualty total in 2016 marked the highest 
number of annual recorded casualties in Monitor data since 1999 (9,228), the most 
child casualties ever recorded, and the highest number of annual casualties caused 
by improvised mines.
Casualties were identified in 52 states and four other areas in 2016, of which 35 are States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
  The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (78%) where 
their status was known, which is similar to the past three years.
  In 2016, children accounted for 42% of all civilian casualties where the age was 
known.
  Women and girls made up 16% of all casualties where the sex was known, a slight 
increase compared to 2015 and recent years.
  The Monitor has recorded more than 110,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global 
tracking began in 1999, including some 80,000 survivors.
CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE
Sixty-one states and areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of November 2017.
  This includes 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 states not party, and four 
other areas. 
  Algeria declared completion of clearance in February 2017. Mozambique, which 
had declared completion in 2015 but subsequently found previously unidentified 
antipersonnel mine contamination in 2016 and 2017, completed clearance in May 2017.
  Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100 km2 total per country) 
is believed to exist in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, and Turkey.
About 170 km2 of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2016, almost the same 
amount as in 2015.
  In 2016, more than 232,000 antipersonnel mines and some 29,000 antivehicle mines 
were destroyed. This represented a significant increase from 2015 results.
  The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2016 was achieved in Afghanistan, 
Croatia, Iraq, and Cambodia, which together accounted for more than 83% of recorded 
clearance.
  Over the past five years (2012–2016), approximately 927 km2 of mined areas 
have been cleared. Some 1.1 million antipersonnel mines and more than 68,000 
antivehicle mines have been destroyed in the context of mine and battle area 
clearance.
Twenty-eight States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance 
of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.
  One state, Ukraine, is in violation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty due to missing 
its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline without having requested and being granted an 
extension.
  Jordan and Nigeria, where antipersonnel mine contamination is found, should 
declare that they have obligations under Article 5 and request a new deadline to 
complete clearance. 
  Three States Parties were granted extended clearance deadlines at the Fifteenth 
Meeting of States Parties in 2016: Ecuador, Niger, and Peru. Five States Parties 
requested extended deadlines for approval at the Sixteenth Meeting of States 











  Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their treaty-mandated 
clearance deadlines: Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritania, and Peru.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$564.5 million in international and 
national support for mine action in 2016, an increase of $39.3 million (7%) from 2015. 
Thirty-two donors contributed $479.5 million in international support for mine action to 
40 states and three other areas. This represents an increase of almost $85.5 million (22%) 
from 2015.
Eleven affected states reported providing $85.0 million in national support for their own 
mine action programs, a decrease of $46.2 (35%) million compared with 2015. More than 
$35 million of this decrease occurred in one country, Angola.
After three years of declining support (a 26% decrease between 2012 and 2015), total 
international support provided in 2016 represents the third-highest level of the past 
decade—after the $498.9 million provided in 2012, and the $480.4 million in 2010.
  The top five mine action donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), 
Japan, Germany, and Norway—contributed 70% of all international funding, with a 
combined total of $335.6 million.
  Twenty donors increased their funding in 2016, with the EU and Germany accounting 
for $55 million (64%) of the global increase.
  The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Croatia, Cambodia, and Lao PDR—
received $258.7 million, or 54% of all international support in 2016.
  Iraq received more funding than any other country and from the largest number of 
donors.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
In 2016–2017, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine 
victims suffered from a lack of adequate resources to fulfill the commitments of the 2014–
2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to the 31 States Parties with significant 
numbers of mine victims.
  Although approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination 
mechanisms, survivors’ representatives participated in just 17 of the coordinating 
processes among those 20 States Parties; even then this often did not result in their 
contributions being taken into account.
  States Parties still need to demonstrate what they are doing to increase the capacity 
of survivors’ organizations and to enhance their meaningful participation in all 
relevant matters. 
  In many states and regions, facilities providing rehabilitation services were 
limited, were often not available in all remote areas where needed, and sometimes 
prohibitively expensive. However, construction of several much-needed prosthetics 
centers was reported in 2016–2017. 
  Access to employment, training, and other income-generation support activities was 
reduced noticeably in many of the States Parties over the past few years, leaving 
significant gaps where opportunities for livelihoods were most needed.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, PRODUCTION, AND 
TRANSFER
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 53 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 2.2 million destroyed in 2016.
  Belarus completed the destruction of its stockpiles in April 2017 after being in 
violation of the convention since 2008.
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  As many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile antipersonnel 
landmines. 
  In 1999, states stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the 
global total may be less than 50 million.
  NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Western Sahara were reported to possess stocks.
Eighty-six States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, 
including 34 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.
  In September 2017, Algeria destroyed the 5,970 antipersonnel mines it retained for 
training purposes after completing its landmine clearance program.
Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not 
party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.
  Eleven states claim a right to produce antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. 
  While most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines, new 
information emerged that active production is on-going in India. 
The use of factory-produced antipersonnel mines in conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen, where 
declared stockpiles had been destroyed, indicates that some transfers, either internally 
among actors or from sources external to the country, are occurring.
  Companies from Egypt and India exhibited sales brochures offering antipersonnel 
mines, or components for them, at an international arms fair in February 2017 in 
Abu Dhabi.
  At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have formal moratoriums on 
the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, and the US.
TREATY COMPLIANCE
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has 
been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities 
have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, there are remaining 
compliance concerns regarding a small number of issues.
  One state, Ukraine, is in violation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty due to missing 
its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline without having requested and being granted an 
extension.
  Yemen previously confirmed that its forces violated the treaty by using antipersonnel 
mines in 2011. As of November 2017, investigations were still pending.
  Greece and Ukraine have missed their deadlines to complete stockpile destruction. 
Ukraine has 4.9 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed, while 
Greece has 643,267. 
  A total of 71 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for 
training and research purposes, of which 37 retain more than 1,000 mines. Finland, 
Turkey, and Bangladesh each retain more than 12,000 mines.
  Only 48% of States Parties have submitted annual reports for calendar year 2016, 
a slight increase from the previous year (45%). A total of 83 States Parties have not 
submitted a report for calendar year 2016. Only one State Party has not submitted 











Billboard in Slavyansk, Donetsk region of Ukraine, warns of dangers posed by mines and 
unexploded ordnance.










2017 marks 20 years since the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted in Oslo on 18 September 1997 
and opened for signature in Ottawa less than three months later. In between those key 
milestones, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its then coordinator 
Jody Williams were awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. 
After two decades, the Mine Ban Treaty has matured into an emerging international norm 
with impressive universality. A total of 162 States Parties are implementing the treaty’s 
provisions prohibiting antipersonnel landmines and requiring victim assistance, clearance 
of mined areas within 10 years, and destruction of stockpiled mines within four years. Most 
of the 35 countries that remain outside of the treaty are nonetheless abiding by its key 
provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong.
But not all States Parties are on track to fulfill their Mine Ban Treaty obligations in a 
timely fashion. Missed stockpile destruction deadlines, missed deadlines for extensions of 
mine clearance deadlines, and repeated requests for extensions of mine clearance deadlines 
raise compliance concerns.
Additionally, new landmine use, particularly the widespread use of so-called improvised 
mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), is resulting in a significant increase in casualties 
and threatening to undermine the progress toward the long-held goal of a landmine-free 
world. While mine use by government forces remains a rare phenomenon, the government 
forces of states not party Myanmar and Syria used antipersonnel landmines in 2016 and 
2017. 
NSAGs used antipersonnel landmines in at least nine countries, including Ukraine and 
Yemen. The extensive use of improvised mines by the forces of the Islamic State (IS) has 
created new casualties and contaminated land. 
These improvised landmines are often referred to as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
or booby-traps. However, most are exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
and therefore meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine contained in the Mine Ban Treaty 
and are prohibited regardless of whether they were fabricated in a factory or elsewhere. 
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Some states have chosen not to use the humanitarian disarmament framework provided 
by the Mine Ban Treaty to address what they call the “IED threat” and instead pursue 
non-binding measures through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Such an 
approach is short-sighted, misguided, and costly. It may appeal to states that have not joined 
the Mine Ban Treaty such as China, Russia, and the United States (US), but it ignores a key 
opportunity to remind NSAGs of the stigma that the Mine Ban Treaty has created against 
any use of antipersonnel mines, by any actor, under any circumstances. In November 2016, 
the ICBL called on Mine Ban Treaty States Parties to condemn any new use of improvised 
antipersonnel mines and seek out new ways to stigmatize and stop this use.1 As Mine Ban 
Treaty president Austria affirmed in October 2017, the Mine Ban Treaty clearly encompasses 
all antipersonnel mines, regardless of whether they are improvised or factory-produced, and 
irrespective of who used them.2
Like-minded governments, UN agencies, and international organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva International Center for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continue to work together with the ICBL to address Mine 
Ban Treaty compliance challenges in a cooperative manner. The unity demonstrated by that 
community over the past two decades remains strong and focused on the Mine Ban Treaty’s 
ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel 
mines. 
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES
In this reporting period—October 2016 through October 2017—Landmine Monitor has 
confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Myanmar and Syria, 
neither of which are party to the Mine Ban Treaty. There have been no allegations of the 
use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period. 
Landmine Monitor recorded new use of antipersonnel 
mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.3
There was no new use of antipersonnel mines in 
Colombia for the first time since the Monitor began 
publishing in 1999. The Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the Colombian 
government signed an agreement in November 2016 
to end the armed conflict. This resulted in a halt to the 
FARCs widespread use of improvised antipersonnel 
landmines and the surrender and destruction of its 
stockpile (see below). On 1 October 2017, a ceasefire 
agreement between the government of Colombia and 
the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército 
de Liberación Nacional, ELN) took effect.4
1 Statement by the ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016, bit.
ly/ICBL15MSP30Nov.
2 Explanation of vote by Austria, UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security, New York, 31 October 2017.
3 NSAGs used mines in at least 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–
2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries 
in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. NSAGs often use improvised mines, rather 
than factory-made antipersonnel mines. In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use 
of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
4 “Colombia Cease-Fire Agreement Takes Effect Sunday,” Voice of America, 30 September 2017, www.voanews.
com/a/colombia-cease-fire-takes-effect-october-1/4050834.html.



























The use of landmines, improvised landmines, and other types of IEDs by Boko Haram 
militants in Nigeria has become more acute. Nigeria has not provided an Article 7 transparency 
report since 2012; the required annual report should update States Parties regarding 
new mine use within the country. Nigeria also did not provide updated information at the 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2016.
Landmine Monitor has been unable to confirm allegations of new antipersonnel mine use 
by NSAGs in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Libya, Mali, Niger, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. 
USE BY AND IN STATES NOT PARTY
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently 
documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in Myanmar. 
In September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Myint Nwe informed 
parliament that the army continues to use landmines in internal armed conflict. He stated 
that government forces, known as Tatmadaw, used landmines to protect state-owned 
factories, bridges, and power towers, and its outposts in military operations. The deputy 
minister stated that landmines were removed when the military abandoned outposts, or 
warning signs were placed where landmines were planted, and soldiers were not present.5 
In June 2017, a Ministry of Defense official stated to the Landmine Monitor that the military 
does not use landmines near highly populated areas.6
According to eyewitness accounts, photographic evidence, and multiple reports, 
antipersonnel mines have been laid between Myanmar’s two major land crossings with 
Bangladesh, resulting in casualties among Rohingya refugees fleeing government attacks 
on their homes. The mine use began in late August 2017, when Myanmar government forces 
began operations against the Rohingya population, causing the flight of more than 600,000 
people to neighboring Bangladesh. It is unclear if this mine use has continued as parts of 
the border area remain inaccessible.
Displaced Rohingya civilians who crossed into Bangladesh witnessed a military truck 
arrive on the Myanmar side of the border from which they witnessed Myanmar government 
soldiers unloading three crates on 28 August.7 They said the soldiers removed antipersonnel 
landmines from the crates and placed them in the ground, later returning at night to place 
more mines. On 5 September, Reuters reported that two Bangladeshi sources witnessed three 
to four groups working near the border’s barbed wire fence “putting something into the 
ground” that Reuters subsequently determined to be landmines.8 Also on 5 September, two 
children from Myanmar who had fled to Bangladesh were injured after reportedly attempting 
to destroy landmines they discovered on the border.9
5 “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 
September 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-09-13-red.pdf.
6 Landmine Monitor meeting with Min Htike Hein, Assistant Permanent Secretary to the Minister for 
Defense, Naypyitaw, 26 June 2017.
7 Email and phone interviews with researchers working with an NGO assisting displaced Rohingya civilians 
who wished to remain anonymous, 17 September 2017. According to the researchers, the mines were 
emplaced within Taung Pyo Let Yar village tract of Maungdaw township, adjacent to border pillar No. 
31 in Bangladesh, an area that demarcates the beginning of the land border between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar. Researchers told Landmine Monitor that the landmine use continued over the following days, 
progressing northeast along the border within the townships of Mee Taik, Nga Yant Chaung, Hlaing Thi, 
Bauk Shu Hpweit, and In Tu Lar. 
8 Krishna N Das, “Exclusive: Bangladesh protests over Myanmar’s suspected landmine use near border,” 
Reuters, 5 September 2017, bit.ly/ReutersBangladesh5Sep17; and Ananya Roy, “Bangladesh accuses 
Myanmar government of laying landmines near border,” International Business Times, 6 September 2017, 
bit.ly/IBTlandmine6Sep17.
9 S. Bashu Das, “2 Rohingya children injured in landmine blast near Naikhongchhari border,” Dhaka Tribune, 
5 September 2017, bit.ly/Rohingyachildren5Sep17.
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Amnesty International reported on 9 September that it had spoken to several eyewitnesses 
who said they saw Myanmar military forces, including military personnel and the Border Guard 
Police, using antipersonnel mines near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh.10 Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) reported on 23 September that military personnel had planted antipersonnel 
mines in northern Rakhine state prior to their attacks on predominantly Rohingya villages.11 
Rohingya refugees from Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine state told HRW 
that they saw the Burmese military laying antipersonnel mines on roads as the military 
entered and attacked villagers. Two other Rohingya refugees told HRW that men in apparent 
Myanmar military uniforms were seen in the northern part of Taung Pyo Let Yar performing 
some activity on the ground. One said that on 4 September he observed several soldiers from 
a patrol stop at least twice, kneel down on the ground, dig into the ground with a knife, and 
place a dark item into the earth. Both Amnesty International and HRW reviewed photos of the 
mines used along the Bangladesh border that clearly show PMN-1 type antipersonnel mines 
lying in the ground. Neither organization could determine if these mines were originally 
manufactured in the Soviet Union or copies of that mine made by Myanmar, named MM-2, 
or by China, named Type 58.
NSAGs in Myanmar also used antipersonnel mines in the reporting period. In June 
2017, a local administrator in Tarlaw, Myitkyina township, Kachin state blamed the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) for landmines that had caused civilian casualties near the town as 
well as loss of livestock.12 In January 2017, the Democratic Karen Benevolence Army (DKBA 
-Kyaw Htet) faction acknowledged that it had laid mines that injured two Myanmar Army 
soldiers in the Mae Tha Wor area of Hlaingbwe township in Kayin state.13 In November 2016, 
two members of the KIA were apprehended by government forces, and confessed to laying 
landmines near Labunkadaung village in Hpakan township. When the army took the KIA 
soldiers to the spot to defuse the mines they had laid, one exploded, killing both of them.14 In 
September and October 2016, mines were laid during armed conflict in Hlaingbwe township 
by a faction of the DKBA.15
Syria 
In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel mines in 
the country’s border areas.16 A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken 
many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”17
In January 2016, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF) reported 
that Syrian government forces laid landmines around the town of Madaya in Rif Dimashq 
governorate, 10 kilometers from the Lebanon border. According to MSF, civilians trying to 
10 Amnesty International, “Myanmar Army landmines along border with Bangladesh pose deadly threat to 
fleeing Rohingya,” 9 September 2017, bit.ly/AIMyanmer9Sep17.
11 HRW, “Landmines Deadly for Fleeing Rohingya: Military Lays Internationally Banned Weapon,” 23 
September 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/23/burma-landmines-deadly-fleeing-rohingya.
12 Tun Lin Aung, “Landmines scare Myitkyina farmers,” Eleven Myanmar, 2 June 2017, www.elevenmyanmar.
com/local/9806.
13 Ye Mon and Ei Ei Thu, “Kayin landmine scare sparks tourism fears,” Myanmar Times, 6 January 2017, 
www.mmtimes.com/national-news/24435-explosion-reignites-landmine-fears.html.
14 “Landmine explosion kills two Kia troops,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 29 November 2016, 
www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-11-29-red.pdf.
15 Unpublished information provided to the Landmine Monitor by the Karen Human Rights Group, 6 
September 2017. This DKBA faction has been referred to as DKBA #907, Kloh Htoo Baw (Golden Drum), 
and Brigade #5. Each of these terms refers to different configurations of DKBA units commanded by 
the brigadier general commonly known as Na Kha Mway, whose real name is Saw Lah Pwe. See also, 
“Landmine kills Kayin village head,” Eleven Myanmar, 17 September 2016, www.elevenmyanmar.com/
local/5972.
16 ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines,” 2 November 2011, 
http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/syrian-forces-laying-mines.aspx.









flee the city have been killed and injured by “bullets and landmines.”18 In October 2016, 
residents of Madaya claimed that the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, operating together 
with Syrian government forces, laid antipersonnel mines around the town. A medical group 
and a media organization reported that “landmines” have been laid around the edge of the 
town.19
The non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) used landmines extensively in 2017, with 
the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reporting 12 casualties in Raqqa governorate 
in just August and September, from incidents in Kasrat Srour,20 Raqqa city,21 and Hneida.22 
Syria’s state-run news agency reported in October that a photographer with Syrian state 
TV was killed in the central Homs province when a landmine left behind by IS militants 
exploded.23
As IS retreated from former strongholds, it left behind improvised landmines and booby-
traps in a last-ditch effort to kill civilians and government forces. The SNHR reported several 
incidents from mines that IS fighters likely laid, as the group controlled the territory for 
prolonged periods of time. For example, in Aleppo governate alone, SNHR reported civilian 
casualties in August, September, and October 2016 from landmines that IS apparently laid 
in the villages of Najm,24 Abu Qalqal,25 Al Humar,26 and Al Dadat.27 In October 2017, a British 
citizen fighting with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) was killed while clearing 
landmines in the abandoned Raqqa city.28 Between September 2015 and January 2017, Mines 
Advisory Groups (MAG) cleared 7,500 improvised mines and other improvised devices from 
Iraq and Syria.29
During a five-day investigation in Manbij in early October 2016, HRW collected the names 
of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines, including booby-traps, 
laid by IS in schools, homes, and on roads during and after the fighting for control for the 
city, involving IS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and 
18 MSF, “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” 7 January 2016, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/
syria-siege-and-starvation-madaya. 
19 See, “Injured by one of 8,000 landmines in desperate escape bid, Madaya man faces double amputation,” 
Syria Direct, 5 October 2016, bit.ly/SyriaDirect5Oct2016; Syrian American Medical Association, “Madaya: 
Starvation Under Siege,” January 2016, p. 1, www.sams-usa.net/foundation/images/Report_Madaya_
Starvation_Under_Siege_.pdf; and Monitor email interview with Kristen Gillespie Demilio, Editor-in-Chief, 
Syria Direct, 7 October 2016.
20 SNHR, “Civilians killed in ISIS landmine planted by ISIS in Kasrat Srour village in Raqqa governorate on 
September 23,”  24 September 2017, bit.ly/SNHR24Sep17.
21 SNHR, “Civilians killed in ISIS’s landmine explosion in al Tayyar neighborhood in Raqqa city on September 
14,” 16 September 2017, bit.ly/SNHR16Sep17; SNHR, “Children killed in ISIS’s landmine explosion in 
Raqqa city on August 14,” 15 August 2017, bit.ly/SNHR15Aug17; SNHR,  “A mother and her son killed 
by ISIS landmine explosion in Raqqa city on August 7,” 8 August 2017, bit.ly/SNHR7Aug17; and SNHR, 
“Victims killed by ISIS landmine explosion near the southern entrance of Raqqa city on August 4,” 5 
August 2017, bit.ly/SNHR5Aug17.
22 SNHR, “Aziz Ajjan killed in ISIS’s landmine explosion in Hneida village in Raqqa governorate on August 6,” 
7 August 2017, bit.ly/Raqqa7Aug.
23 “IS land mine kills Syrian state TV photographer,” Associated Press (Beirut), 17 October 2017, www.foxnews.
com/world/2017/10/10/latest-is-land-mine-kills-syrian-state-tv-photographer.html.
24 SNHR, “Children died in ISIS landmine explosion in Najm village in Aleppo governorate, August 23,” 
London, 23 August 2016, bit.ly/sn4hr23Aug2016.
25 SNHR , “Victims died due to ISIS landmine explosion in Abu Qalqal town in Aleppo governorate, September 
2,”  London, 2 September 2016, bit.ly/SNHR2Sep16.
26 SNHR, “Civilians died due to ISIS landmines explosion in Mazyounet Al Humar village in Aleppo 
governorate, September 21,” London, 21 September 2016, bit.ly/SNHR21Sep16.
27 SNHR, “Children died in ISIS landmine explosion in O’wn Al Dadat village in Aleppo governorate in 
October 4,” London, 4 October 2016, bit.ly/SNHR4Oct16.
28 Lizzie Dearden, “Jac Holmes: British man who volunteered to fight against Isis killed in Syria,” The 
Independent, 24 October 2017, bit.ly/IndependentJacHolmes.
29 Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton, “MAG: Clearing Improvised Landmines in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, Vol. 21, Issue 1, April 2017, http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol21/iss1/.
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other forces supported by the US government.30 Nearly all the incidents HRW documented 
appeared to have been caused by improvised mines, rather than by explosives detonated by 
a vehicle or by remote-control. 
USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN OTHER STATES 
NOT PARTY
Pakistan
In March 2017, Pakistan reconfirmed that antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and IEDs 
have been used by NSAGs throughout the country.31 NSAGs in Balochistan and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used antipersonnel landmines 
and victim-activated explosive devices during the reporting period. Pakistan’s Parliamentary 
Committee on SAFRON (State and Frontier Regions) urged the government to establish a 
fund for the victims of landmine blasts. The committee expressed discontentment that at 
least 50 people have died and hundreds of others have been injured in landmine blasts in 
South Waziristan agency alone. It noted that according to a rough estimate, about 10,000 
landmines are laying in the Mehsud inhabited area, which need to be removed before they 
claim further lives.32
Use has been attributed to Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan insurgent groups as 
well as clan feuds.33 In April 2016, a representative of Pakistan told the Monitor that 14% 
of recovered IEDs used by militants in Pakistan are victim-activated. The explosive devices 
are victim-activated through pressure-plate and infra-red initiation. Sometimes these 
improvised antipersonnel mines are used as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one 
initiator will set off multiple explosive devices.34
India
In July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhatisgarh state informed the state 
news agency that “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable places, 
where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”35 The use of 
these victim-activated improvised mines was attributed by the police to the Communist 
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.36 
In September 2017, an elephant was killed after it stepped on a landmine attributed to 
the CPI-M in Jharkhand state.37 In May 2017, India’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 
30 HRW Press Release, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016, www.hrw.
org/news/2016/10/26/syria-improvised-mines-kill-injure-hundreds-manbij.
31 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 31 March 2017, bit.ly/PakCCWII2017.
32 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization 
(SPADO), 21 September 2017. He noted that media outreach and humanitarian response is very limited 
in South Waziristan but it has been confirmed that the local communities have carried out some other 
protests requesting the authorities to take immediate measures to clear the areas from landmines and 
ERW and provide support to the landmine victims.
33 Email from Raza Shah Khan, SPADO, 21 September 2017.
34 Presentation given by Pakistani delegation to the CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, 6 April 
2016, bit.ly/PakistanCCW6Apr2016; and Landmine Monitor interview with Pakistani delegation to the 
CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 8 April 2016.
35 Tikeshwar Patel, “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: police,” Press Trust of India, 24 
July 2017, www.ptinews.com/news/8915393_IEDs-pose-huge-challenge-in-efforts-to-counter-Naxals--
police.
36 The CPI-M and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also 
have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.









recovered a cache of 53 landmines, in Jharkhand state and in December 2016, the CRPF 
recovered another cache of 120 landmines, also in Jharkhand state.38
USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 
Use of improvised mines and other IEDs by anti-government elements in 2016 and 2017 
resulted in further casualties. In June, Afghanistan informed States Parties that new use of 
pressure-plate improvised mines, which are causing approximately 60 deaths a month, was 
adding to their clearance burden and making it hard to meet their Article 5 obligations.39 
There have been no reports of antipersonnel mine use by coalition or Afghan national forces.
The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban, Haqqani 
Network, and IS. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-
government forces used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers 
throughout 2016 and the first half of 2017. However, UNAMA also reported that use of 
pressure-plate improvised mines40 substantially contributed to the increases in both woman 
and child casualties and a 42% increase in civilian deaths by improvised mines compared to 
the same period in 2016.41
Iraq 
While there were not any reports of use of 
antipersonnel mines by government forces or 
its international coalition partners, IS forces 
fighting the government of Iraq have used 
improvised landmines, other types of IEDs, and 
victim-activated booby-traps extensively since 
2014.42
IS continued its extensive use of improvised 
landmines into 2017. In Mosul, scores of 
civilians were killed by improvised mines while 
attempting to flee fighting between IS and 
Iraqi Federal Police units.43 The group has also 
planted improvised mines around mass graves, 
in an effort to kill investigative journalists and 
aid workers.44 As IS continues to lose ground 
in Iraq, it consistently leaves improvised mines 
38 “Over 50 landmines recovered in Jharkhand,” Statesman, 16 May 2017, www.thestatesman.com/cities/over-
50-landmines-recovered-in-jharkhand-1494065802.html; and “120 land mines found in Latehar forest,” 
Times of India, 12 December 2016, bit.ly/landminesLatehar.
39 Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Clearance, Geneva, 8–9 
June 2017, bit.ly/AfgClearanceInt2017.
40 A pressure plate is a method for triggering a detonation of an explosive device by the pressure exerted by 
the weight of a person or a vehicle. If the device is capable of being triggered by the presence, proximity, 
or activity of a human being, it is banned under the Mine Ban Treaty.
41 UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict mid-year report 2017,” Kabul, July 2017, p. 
5, bit.ly/UNAMAAfgmid2017.
42 See, for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” IRIN, 6 November 2014, www.irinnews.org/
news/2014/11/06/isis’s-latest-threat-laying-landmines; and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,” 
Buzzfeed, 19 March 2015, bit.ly/HiddenEnemyIraq. 
43 Kareem Khadder, Ingrid Formanek, and Laura Smith-Spark, “Mosul battle: Civilians killed by landmines 
as they flee, police say,” CNN, 25 February 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/02/25/middleeast/western-mosul-
offensive/index.html.
44 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis rigs mass grave with landmines to kill journalists and war crime investigators,” The 
Independent, 1 March 2017, bit.ly/ISISrigsgraves.
A Valmara 69 mine in a mine field dating back to the 1980s 
outside Basra, Iraq.
© Noe Falk Nielsen/Danish Demining Group, May 2017
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and booby-traps behind as it retreats.45 Between September 2015 and January 2017, MAG 
cleared 7,500 improvised mines and other improvised devices from Iraq and Syria.46
Nigeria
Boko Haram militants have allegedly been laying unspecified types of landmines and victim-
activated IEDs in Nigeria since mid-2014.47 In both 2016 and early 2017, UNMAS identified 
ongoing extensive use of improvised mines by the Boko Haram group in northern areas of 
Nigeria. UNMAS also received reports of possible use of factory-made antipersonnel mines.48 
A number of incidents occurred apparently from the use improvised mines. On 21 August 
2017, at least two Nigerian cattle farmers were killed and three severely injured when they 
stepped on a landmine while traveling to Biu, Borno state. The civilians were apparently 
attempting to flee a Boko Haram ambush, and were running across fields when they triggered 
the landmine, allegedly planted by the insurgents.49
Ukraine 
Landmine Monitor has received no information that Ukrainian government forces have used 
antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2016–2017.50 Since 2014, the 
government of Ukraine has stated that it has not used antipersonnel mines in the conflict 
and has accused Russian-supported forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.51 In December 
2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the 
“Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, 
such as volunteer battalions.52
There is significant evidence present at different locations that antipersonnel mines 
of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s as well as antipersonnel mines 
with production markings from the 2000s, indicating Russian origin, are available.53 
45 “Islamic State is losing land but leaving mines behind,” The Economist, 30 March 2017, bit.ly/ISleavesmines.
46 Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton, “MAG: Clearing Improvised Landmines in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, Vol. 21, Issue 1, April 2017, http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol21/iss1/.
47 See, for example, “Five killed in Boko Haram mine blast, ambush,” Vanguard, 21 June 2017, www.
vanguardngr.com/2017/06/five-killed-boko-haram-mine-blast-ambush/.
48 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria, 3 to 14 April 2017,” p. 2.
49 “Au moins deux morts dans l’explosion d’une mine anti-personnelle au Nigeria,” Voice of America, 21 August 
2017, bit.ly/VOANigeria21Aug17.
50 Russia stated in October 2017, “We note with great regret that the information on alleged violations of 
Ottawa Convention is not verified at all. As we can see with regard to events in Ukraine the UN Secretary 
General investigation mechanism envisaged by Ottawa Convention remains inactive. Moreover, at 
the 2015-2016 State Parties meetings no one even tried to question Kiev’s compliance with Ottawa 
Convention during the civil war that it unleashed in the South-East of the country.” Statement by 
Vladimir Yermakov, UNGA First Committee Debate on Conventional Weapons, New York, 20 October 2017, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com17/statements/20Oct_Russia.pdf.
51 Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, 
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf; and statement 
of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 
June 2015, bit.ly/Ukraine26June2015.
52 In February 2016, Ukraine stated that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-
detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate 
mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.” “Report and Preliminary Observations Committee 
On Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Chile, Peru and Sweden), 2016 Intersessional Meetings,” 
May 2016, p. 4, bit.ly/MBTComplianceMay2016. The Military Prosecutor confirmed to HRW that an 
assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-
1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets 
with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance 
with the Mine Ban Treaty.
53 Evidence of markings from 2003: Security Service of the Ukraine, “SBU reveals three hidings with 
ammunition and Russian mine in ATO area,” 15 November 2016, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/
view/2256 - .cuYxfDr2.dpbs. Markings from 2010: Ukrainian Military TV, “Докази присутності російських 








Ukrainian armed forces and the security services continue to confiscate caches of antipersonnel 
landmines along the front line, including MON-50 directional mines,54 MON-90 directional 
mines,55 PMN-1 and PMN-2 blast mines,56 and POM-2 scatterable mines.57 Ukrainian soldiers 
were killed or wounded by antipersonnel mines in 2017 on 2 October, 11 August, 15 July, and 
on 9 May.58 In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that 
separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines.59 Later that month, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine 
reported the presence of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing 
the SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv 
province and Luhansk province.60 In April 2017, an international OSCE observer was killed 
and two others injured by an antivehicle mine in Luhansk region.61
Yemen
Due to the extremely limited access to the country, it is not clear if antipersonnel landmines 
were used in Yemen in 2017. However, new use was recorded during late 2016 and in 
previous years.
In April 2017, HRW reported evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines in the 
54 Ukrainian Military TV, “Докази присутності російських військ на Донбасі,” YouTube.com, 1 March 2017, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfA7c4iBBlU; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals 2 Russian 
mines in ATO area,” 2 May 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3281 - .BFgZrg1s.dpbs; 
Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU seizes landmines produced in Russia in the ATO area,” 25 April 2017, www.
ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/21/view/3227 - .o3KKyH3U.dpbs; and Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU 
reveals cache with explosives in ATO area,” 16 January 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/
view/2553#.gDmJqCLm.dpbs.
55 Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ виявила дві схованки зі зброєю та боєприпасами у районі проведення 
АТО,” 30 August 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/1/view/3842#.ihBWxsxc.dpbs.
56 “A stockpile of antipersonel mines retrieved from a separatist storage position,” Instagram Post by bring_
me_the_swampy, 23 September 2017, www.instagram.com/p/BZZIg4_nnDx/?taken-by=bring_me_the_
swampy; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals cache with mines, explosives and anti-tank grenade 
launchers in ATO area,” 27 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3253 - .FR2O7p8Y.
dpbs; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU seizes ammunitions of Russian origin in the ATO area,” 11 April 
2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3146 - .Kz15RzRS.dpbs; Security Service of Ukraine, 
“SBU records militants using weapons of Russian production,” 1 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/
category/1/view/3085 - .xM1gyOfw.dpbs; and Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals prohibited mines 
in ATO area that are in operational service with Russian army,” 16 May 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/
category/1/view/3354#.lejPDlBG.dpbs.
57 Swampy, “Clearance around forward positions,” Beyond the Borders, 27 October 2017, https://swampy.
freq.wtf/2017/10/27/3672/. Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU prevents terrorist attacks prepared by 
Russian secret services in Mariupol,” 17 August 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3793 
- .tidSa5nz.dpbs. Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU deactivates mine of Russian production in ATO area,” 
26 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3236 - .GCLfhJGT.dpbs. Security Service of 
Ukraine, “SBU reveals three hidings with ammunition and Russian mine in ATO area,” 15 November 2016, 
https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/2256#.Iyvz95Vv.dpbs.
58 One killed in action (KIA) by OZM-72 mine in Bohdanivka, Mariupol: “Ministry of Defense: Russian sniper 
unit was deployed near Zaitseve,” Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, 2 October 2017, http://uacrisis.org/60925-
polkovnyk-motuzyanyk-7; Three wounded and one killed in action by antipersonnel mines in Avdiivka 
and Zaitseve, Donetsk Oblast: “Зведення прес-центру штабу АТО” (“Briefing of the press center of the 
ATO headquarters”), ATO Press Center, 11 August 2017; One killed in action by antipersonnel mine in 
Shyrokyne, Mariupol: “Боєць з великої літери,” Five News, 18 July 2017, www.5.ua/regiony/boiets-z-
velykoi-litery-dobrovoltsia-z-57i-bryhady-zsu-provely-v-ostanniu-put-150581.html; One wounded by 
PMN-2 mine: Photos added to Facebook, by Vasyl Sakovets, Facebook, 15 June 2017, www.facebook.com/
vasil.sakovets/posts/1350466698400599?aid=13P92Y.wghot.
59 Ukraine Crisis Media Center, “Most militant attacks - in Mariupol direction – Col. Andriy Lysenko,” 3 
September 2016, http://uacrisis.org/ua/46719-lisenko-20.
60 “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 
19:30, 26 September 2016,” OSCE SMM to Ukraine, Kiev, 27 September 2016, www.osce.org/ukraine-
smm/268961.
61 “Landmine blast kills OSCE observer in Ukraine,” Al Jazeera, 23 April 2017, www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/04/land-blast-kills-osce-observer-ukraine-170423125142890.html.
16 
governorates of Aden, Marib, Sanaa, and Taizz in 2015–2016.62 It attributed responsibility 
for this mine use to Houthi forces and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
In September 2016, HRW reported Houthi-Saleh forces’ use of antipersonnel mines in Aden, 
Abyan, Marib, Lahj, and Taizz governorates in 2015–2016.63
HRW also reported that the Islamist armed group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), which is also a party to the conflict, used antipersonnel mines in Yemen in 2016.64
On 2 April 2017, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is controlled by the Houthis 
and Saleh’s General People’s Congress Party, denied that Houthi-Saleh forces had used 
antipersonnel landmines, affirming the Sanaa-based authorities are “vigilant in abiding by 
[their] commitments” under the Mine Ban Treaty.65
In early 2017, a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that Houthi-Saleh forces have 
used victim-activated IEDs that deployed antivehicle mines as the main charge in Taizz.66 
Antivehicle landmines claimed casualties in Bayda governorate in October 2017 and Jawf 
governorate in April 2017, but it is unclear when those mines were laid.67
A joint operation by a coalition of states led by Saudi Arabia against Houthi forces in 
Yemen was continuing as of October 2017. Although there is evidence of use of cluster 
munitions by members of this coalition, there has been no evidence to suggest that members 
of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in Yemen.
Allegations of new use and other reports
Landmine Monitor has also recorded allegations and other reports of new mine use by NSAGs 
in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, as well as states not 
party Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Monitor cannot confirm use in any of these instances.
Various media outlets have continued to report new “landmine” use by Boko Haram 
militants in Chad and Niger.68 Landmine Monitor has not confirmed the nature of the devices 
used or the circumstances of the allegations. 
62 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi-Saleh Forces Using Landmines,” 20 April 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/20/
yemen-houthi-saleh-forces-using-landmines.
63 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” 8 September 2016, www.hrw.org/
news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims; HRW, “Yemen: New Houthi Landmine 
Use,” 18 November 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/18/yemen-new-houthi-landmine-use; and HRW, 
“Yemen: Houthis Used Landmines in Aden,” 5 September 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/yemen-
houthis-used-landmines-aden.
64 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi-Saleh Forces Using Landmines,” 20 April 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/20/
yemen-houthi-saleh-forces-using-landmines.
65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen response in letter to HRW, 2 April 2017, bit.ly/YemenHRW2Apr2017.
66 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi-Saleh Forces Using Landmines,” 20 April 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/20/
yemen-houthi-saleh-forces-using-landmines.
67 Ali Owaida, “Landmine explosion kills 4 troops in central Yemen,” Anadolu Agency, 18 October 2017, http://
aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/landmine-explosion-kills-4-troops-in-central-yemen/940837; and “Landmine 
explosion kills 2 soldiers in Yemen’s north,” Anadolu Agency, 30 April 2017, http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-
east/landmine-explosion-kills-2-soldiers-in-yemens-north/808574.
68 “Landmine Explosion Kills 6 Soilders at Niger-Nigerian Border,” Africa News, 8 January 2016, www.africanews.
com/2016/01/18/landmine-explosion-kills-6-soilders-at-niger-nigerian-border/; Edwin Kindzeka Moki, 
“Boko Haram Land Mine Kills 2 in Cameroon Military Convoy,” The Daily Mail, 15 February 2016, www.
dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3447888/Boko-Haram-land-kills-2-Cameroon-military-convoy.html; 
Edwin Kindzeka Moki, “Cameroon Vigilantes Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines,” Voice of America News, 4 
March 2016, www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-vigilantes-hunt-for-boko-haram-landmines/3219444.html; 
“Fighting Boko Haram: Landmine seriously injures 3 Cameroonian service men,” Cameroon Concord, 8 
June 2016,bit.ly/CameroonConcord8Jun2016; “Boko Haram landmine kills four Chadian soldiers,” Reuters, 
27 August 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-chad-idUSKCN1120KY; and “Boko Haram 
Landmines Inflict Heavy Toll on Cameroon,” Latin America Herald Tribune, 29 June 2016, www.laht.com/
article.asp?ArticleId=2415012&CategoryId=12395. Niger has not filed an updated Article 7 report 
since 2012, but noted in an Article 5 extension request of March 2016 that new contamination by Boko 
Haram had occurred. Chad submitted an annual Article 7 report in March 2016, but did not include any 
information on new contamination. Cameroon has not filed an updated Article 7 report since 2009 and 








In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines 
have been reported in the northern extreme of the country where it shares borders with 
Nigeria and Chad. Boko Haram has been documented to manufacture and use improvised 
antipersonnel mines across the border in Nigeria. In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported the presence of landmines in Cameroon’s Fotokol and Mayo 
Moskota, both in Logone et Chari department.69 In 2016 and early 2017, UNMAS identified 
use of improvised mines by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon, but did not indicate if these 
were antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines.70
In August 2016 in Libya, an allegation surfaced that IS militants laid landmines sometime 
prior to being forced out of Derna in eastern Libya in mid-2015. The Monitor is not in a 
position to verify the allegation.71 According to media reports, IS militants laid landmines 
and victim-activated explosive devices around Sirte.72
In Mali, 39 casualties were reported to be caused by improvised mines being detonated by 
vehicles. Handicap International indicates that these devices, equipped with a pressure-plate 
initiating mechanism, could be activated upon contact or by the weight of a person. However, 
they have only been reported to be activated by either vehicles or command detonation.73
In the Philippines, in May 2017, the Philippines Army was engaged in armed conflict 
with an Islamist armed group in Marawi,74 Mindanao, who reportedly used improvised mines 
resulting in casualties.75 There have also been periodic reports of improvised mine use 
by Abu Sayyaf.76 In 2017, the Monitor was provided a technical drawing of New People’s 
Army/Communist Party of the Philippines command-detonated landmines fitted with an 
antihandling device that can be turned on or off manually.77 
In Tunisia, NSAGs in Jebel Al-Cha’anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate near the 
Algerian border have allegedly laid improvised antipersonnel mines. The Monitor could 
not independently confirm this. Casualties of improvised mines sometimes referred to as 
“landmines” continued to be reported in 2016 and early 2017.78
Saudi Arabia has reported that soldiers have been injured by landmines on its border 
with Yemen. In 2016 and 2017, reports of mine use and seizures have occurred in Aseer 
69 UNHCR/International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Cameroon: Far North – Displaced Population 
Profiling,” 19 May 2015, bit.ly/UNCHRCameroon19May15. 
70 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Hazard Mitigation Response in Cameroon 9 January – 13 April 
2017,” p. 11.
71 See, “Senior leader in Derna Shura Council killed by an ISIS landmine in Al-Heela,” Libyan Express, 1 August 
2016, bit.ly/LibyaSnrLeader1Aug16.
72 See, Lewis, A.,“Libya forces de-mine and clear Sirte after liberation from Isis militants,” The Independent, 
11 August 2016, bit.ly/DemineSirte11Aug16; Sudarsan Raghavan, “Even with U.S. airstrikes, a struggle 
to oust ISIS from Libyan stronghold,” Washington Post, 7 August 2016, bit.ly/OustISISLibya7Aug17; and “A 
Sirte girl undergoes a massive 17-hour operation for landmine injuries,” The Libya Observer, 29 May 2016, 
bit.ly/SirteGirlLandmine.
73 Email from Maddalena Malgarini, Technical Protection Coordinator, Handicap International-Mali, 26 
September 2017.
74 The group is most commonly referred to as the “Muate group,” but also has been known as Dawlah 
Islamiya and the Islamic State of Lanao, and is reported to be comprised of former MILF guerrillas and 
some foreign militants.
75 See, “AFP: 2 soldiers lost legs after tripping on land mines in Marawi,” GMA News, 18 August 2017, bit.ly/
AFPladnminesMarawi; and “Snipers, land mines delay liberation of Marawi City,” Business Mirror, 26 June 
2017, http://businessmirror.com.ph/snipers-land-mines-delay-liberation-of-marawi-city/.
76 Bong Garcia, “Bomb explosion kills farm owner in Basilan,” SunStar Zamboanga, 20 March 2017, www.
sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2017/03/20/bomb-explosion-kills-farm-owner-basilan-531939.
77 Technical drawings of “New People’s Army (NPA) Improvised Remote Firing Switch with integral anti-lift 
device” based on a device recovered by Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in June 2015 in Sarangani 
province, Mindanao. Provided to the Monitor by email, 9 September 2017.
78 See, for example, “Tunisia landmine blasts kills shepherdess,” News24 (AFP), 17 June 2017, www.news24.
com/Africa/News/tunisia-landmine-blasts-kills-shepherdess-20170616.
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and Jazan provinces. Saudi Arabia has blamed Houthi forces as well as smugglers for using 
antipersonnel mines.79
STOCKPILES OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES 
POSSESSED BY STATES NOT PARTY AND NON-STATE 
ARMED GROUPS
The Monitor estimates that as many 
as 31 of the 35 states not party 
to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile 
antipersonnel landmines. In 1999, the 
Monitor estimated that, collectively, 
states not party stockpiled about 
160 million antipersonnel mines, but 
today the global total may be less 
than 50 million.80
It is unclear if all 31 states are 
currently stockpiling antipersonnel 
mines. Officials from the UAE have 
provided contradictory information 
regarding its possession of stocks, 
while Bahrain and Morocco have 
stated that they have only small 
stockpiles used solely for training 
purposes in clearance and detection 
techniques. 
Three states not party, all in 
the Pacific, have said that they 
do not stockpile antipersonnel 
mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
and Tonga. In its 2012 voluntary 
transparency report, Palestine stated 
that it does not possess a stockpile of 
antipersonnel mines, and it does not 
retain any mines for training purposes.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines 
as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete 
munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to obtain factory-made antipersonnel mines now that 
production and transfers have largely halted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs in states 
not party have acquired landmines by stealing them from government stocks, purchasing 
79 See, “Saudi soldier killed by landmine near Yemen border,” Middle East Online, 9 December 2016, www.
middle-east-online.com/english/?id=80238; and Mohammed Al-Sulami, “Saudi Border Guards stops 
efforts to plant land mines, smuggle weapons in southern Kingdom,” Arab News, 20 March 2017, www.
arabnews.com/node/1071011/saudi-arabia#photo/7.
80 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an 
amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known 
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are 
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China 
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile.
Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel 
mines
Russia 26.5 million
Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total 45 million








































them from corrupt officials, or removing them from minefields. Most appear to make their 
own improvised landmines from locally available materials. 
During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, India, Iraq, 
Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Western Sahara were reported 
to possess stocks of factory-made antipersonnel mines or components to manufacture 
improvised landmines. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government 
forces, reports of significant use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to 
identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.81 Forty-one 
states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.82
In November 2015, Singapore Technologies Engineering announced that it had ceased 
production of antipersonnel mines and published the decision on its website in a section 
entitled “Sustainability Governance.”83 In a letter to PAX, a Dutch NGO, the company’s 
President Tan Pheng Hock stated, “ST Engineering is now no longer in the business of 
designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions or any 
related key components.”84 The Monitor will continue to list Singapore as a producer until 
the government formally commits to no future production. Singapore already observes an 
indefinite export moratorium.
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing 
mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
Production of antipersonnel mines by India appeared to be ongoing in 2016 and 2017. 
Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government transaction 
database list at least a dozen private companies providing components of M-16, M-14, and 
APER 1B antipersonnel mines to the Indian Ordnance Factories in late 2016 and throughout 
2017.85 Components were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition 
81 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that 
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
82 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.
83 See the Singapore Technologies Engineering  2015 annual report, www.stengg.com/media/30108/
st-engineering-annual-report-2015.pdf. See also, Stop Explosive Investments, “Singapore 
Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/
STE18Nov2015. Investors received similar letters; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST 
Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/wp-content/press/
files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.pdf.
84 Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies 
Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.
85 Landmine Monitor complied a listing of “current contracts” showing who the contract was awarded to, 
and which companies applied for consideration, the number of units, cost and total cost and when it 
is to be delivered by plus other information. Indian Ordnance Factories website (accessed 9 November 
2017), http://ofb.gov.in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. All current contracts are with one 
of two Indian Ordnance Factories located in Maharastra state, where the mines are assembled with 
components from private companies. Presumably they produce and add the explosive charge here, as no 
vendor provides more than fuzes, bodies, and other parts.
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Factory Khadki and Ordnance Factory Chandrapur, both in Maharashtra state.86 In February 
2017, a private Indian arms manufacturer had components for bounding fragmentation 
antipersonnel landmines listed within their sales catalogue on display at the IDEX military 
trade event in Abu Dhabi.87
NSAGs in countries including Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Syria make antipersonnel mines. MAG reported in November 2016 that IS produced near 
factory quality improvised mines on a large scale.88
TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES 
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the 
mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to 
antipersonnel mines. 
Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of 
antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999. However, the use of factory-
produced antipersonnel mines in conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen, where declared stockpiles 
had been destroyed, indicates that some transfers, either internally among actors or from 
sources external to the country, are occurring. 
Three types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 
2013: PPM-2 mines, GYATA-64 mines, and Bulgarian-made PSM-1 bounding fragmentation 
mines. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen 
reported stockpiling in the past. This indicates that Yemen’s 2002 declaration to the UN 
Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect 
or incomplete, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In 
a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the 
Houthis and the General People’s Congress, said that individuals had smuggled weapons, 
including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that the current government had not 
been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.89
The State Security Service of Ukraine reported seizing and recovering antipersonnel 
mines from Russian-backed separatists during 2016, including 24 MON-series directional 
fragmentation munitions, five OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, and one PMN-2 blast 
mine.90 In 2017, Ukrainian authorities continue to confiscate caches of antipersonnel mines, 
86 The following companies were listed as having concluded contract listed for production of components 
of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and 
November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s 
Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, 
Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition the following 
companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, 
Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. 
Mine types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines, http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.
php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. From searching the Indian Ordnance Factories website, http://ofb.gov.
in/vendor/general_reports/show/registered_vendors/820 (accessed 8 November 2017).
87 Ashoka Manufacturing Limited, Marketing Brochure, undated, http://ashokagroup.net/brochures/defence.
pdf. Brochure was observed on display at IDEX by Omega Research in February 2017. Email from Omega 
Research, 7 November 2017.
88 MAG Policy Brief, “Humanitarian Response, Improvised Landmines and IEDs: Policy issues for principled 
mine action,” November 2016, www.maginternational.org/download/587908d82414d/. 
89 Letter to HRW from Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2016, www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/supporting_resources/yemeni_mofa_response_to_hrw_landmines_sept_7_2016.pdf.
90 All data taken from State Security Service of Ukraine website for 2016, starting at https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/








including MON-50 directional mines,91 MON-90 directional mines,92 PMN-1 and PMN-2 blast 
mines,93 and POM-2 scatterable mines.94 Ukraine completed its destruction of stockpiled 
PMN mines in 2003; other mine types are possessed by Russia, Ukraine, and any number of 
successor states of the Soviet Union.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, 
have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have 
made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. 
Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.95
In February 2017, the Egyptian Ministry of Military Production advertised “Heliopolis 
plastic antipersonnel landmines” for sale at its display at the IDEX arms fair in Abu Dhabi.96 
Egyptian authorities did not respond to a June 2017 request by the Monitor for further 
information regarding the apparent change in policy on export, and possibly production, 
indicated by the IDEX sales brochure. In December 2012, Egypt said that it “imposed a 
moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines in 1980.”97
UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it 
by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially 
91 Ukrainian Military TV, “Докази присутності російських військ на Донбасі,” YouTube.com, 1 March 2017, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfA7c4iBBlU; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals 2 Russian mines in 
ATO area,” 2 May 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3281#.BFgZrg1s.dpbs; Security 
Service of Ukraine, “SBU seizes landmines produced in Russia in the ATO area,” 25 April 2017, https://
www.ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/21/view/3227#.o3KKyH3U.dpbs; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU 
reveals cache with explosives in ATO area,” 16 January 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/
view/2553#.gDmJqCLm.dpbs;
92 Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ виявила дві схованки зі зброєю та боєприпасами у районі проведення 
АТО,” 30 August 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/1/view/3842#.ihBWxsxc.dpbs.
93 Swampy, “Clearance around forward positions,” Beyond the Borders, 27 October 2017, http://swampy.freq.
wtf/2017/10/27/3672/; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals cache with mines, explosives and anti-
tank grenade launchers in ATO area,” 27 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3253#.
FR2O7p8Y.dpbs; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU seizes ammunitions of Russian origin in the ATO area,” 
11 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3146#.Kz15RzRS.dpbs; Security Service of 
Ukraine, “SBU records militants using weapons of Russian production,” 1 April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/
news/1/category/1/view/3085#.xM1gyOfw.dpbs; and Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU reveals prohibited 
mines in ATO area that are in operational service with Russian army,” 16 May 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/
news/1/category/1/view/3354#.lejPDlBG.dpbs. 
94 Swampy, “Clearance around forward positions,” Beyond the Borders, 27 October 2017, http://swampy.freq.
wtf/2017/10/27/3672/; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU prevents terrorist attacks prepared by Russian 
secret services in Mariupol,” 17 August 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3793#.
tidSa5nz.dpbs; Security Service of Ukraine, “SBU deactivates mine of Russian production in ATO area,” 26 
April 2017, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/3236#.GCLfhJGT.dpbs; and Security Service of 
Ukraine, “SBU reveals three hidings with ammunition and Russian mine in ATO area,” 15 November 2016, 
https://ssu.gov.ua/en/news/1/category/1/view/2256#.Iyvz95Vv.dpbs.
95 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were 
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor 
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian 
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the 
coast of the Gaza Strip.
96 Brochure, Heliopolis Co. for Chemical Industries, National Organization for Military Production, 
Ministry of Military Production, Arab Republic of Egypt, p. 23. AP T78 and AP T79 plastic antipersonnel 
landmines. Received from Omega Research via Twitter, 3 March 2017, twitter.com/Omega_RF/
status/836968523293405185.
97 Statement of Egypt, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution on the Ottawa APLM Convention, L.8,” UNGA First 
Committee, New York, 2 December 2012, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/1com/1com12/eov/L8_Egypt.pdf.
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combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 
States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, 
while 30 acceded.98
The last country to accede to the Mine Ban 
Treaty was Oman on 20 August 2014. 
The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty 
include the Marshall Islands, which is the last 
signatory yet to ratify.
On 2 March 2016, Ambassador Ravinatha 
Pandukabhaya Aryasinha announced that Sri 
Lanka’s cabinet of ministers has approved accession 
to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the instrument of 
accession had not been deposited with the UN as 
of 31 October 2017.99
The US government announced policy measures 
in June and September 2014 banning US production 
and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, 
accelerating stockpile destruction, and banning 
mine use, except on the Korean Peninsula.100 The 
Obama administration also indicated its “aspiration” for the US to “eventually accede to the 
Ottawa Convention,” but there have been few signs of new steps toward that goal.101 The 
administration of Donald Trump has not indicated if US landmine policy will be revisited.
ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Since 1997, the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states 
outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to indicate their support for 
the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. A dozen 
countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after voting in favor of 
consecutive UNGA resolutions.102
On 5 December 2016, UNGA Resolution 71/34 calling for universalization and full 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 164 in favor, none against, 
and 20 abstentions.103 This is a decrease in votes in favor from the 2015 resolution of 
168 states in favor, none against, and 17 abstentions, which was the highest number of 
affirmative votes for the annual resolution.104 Regrettably, Mine Ban Treaty States Parties 
Kuwait, Nicaragua, and Samoa abstained from voting on the annual resolution in 2016. 
98 The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of 
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before 
entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
99 ICBL, “Sri Lanka decides to join Mine Ban Treaty,” 3 March 2016, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/
news/2016/sri-lanka-decides-to-join-mine-ban-treaty.aspx.
100 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White 
House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-
anti-personnel-landmine-policy.
101 Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 
6/27/2014,” The White House, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/WhiteHouse27June2016.
102 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.
103 The 20 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and 
Vietnam.
104 Previously, the resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor in 2013 and 2010, while 
the lowest number of votes in favor was 138 in 2001.
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A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, 
most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the US, and Vietnam.105
Non-state armed groups
Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, 
which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the 
weapon. At least 65 NSAGs have committed to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997.106 
The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split 
into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. 
In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the Colombian government 
signed an agreement in November 2016 to end the armed conflict. This halted the FARC’s 
widespread use of improvised antipersonnel landmines and resulted in the surrender and 
destruction of its stockpile (see below). On 1 October 2017, a ceasefire agreement between 
the government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN) took effect.107 In the agreement, the ELN committed not to use 
antipersonnel landmines that could endanger the civilian population.
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered 
into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of landmines, 
booby-traps, and other explosive devices. Weaknesses of the original protocol and inadequate 
measures to improve it through Amended Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process 
that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. 
As of October 2017, a total of 104 states were party to Amended Protocol II. Only 10 
of these states have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the 
protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the 94 other states are bound by the much 
higher standards provided by the Mine Ban 
Treaty.
The original Protocol II on mines, 
booby-traps, and other devices entered 
into force on 2 December 1983 and has 
largely been superseded by the 1996 
Amended Protocol II, but 13 states that 
are party to the original protocol have 
yet to ratify the amended protocol.108
A total of 17 states that stockpile 
antipersonnel mines are not party to the 
Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, 
or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are 
also landmine producers.
105 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
106 As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by 
the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva 
Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 
2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the 
Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
107 “Colombia Cease-Fire Agreement Takes Effect Sunday,” Voice of America, 30 September 2017, www.voanews.
com/a/colombia-cease-fire-takes-effect-october-1/4050834.html.
108 Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan, and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.
States that stockpile antipersonnel 


















Note: Italics indicate states that also reserve the 
right to produce antipersonnel mines.
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STATUS AND OPERATION OF THE MINE BAN 
TREATY
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has 
been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities 
have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, there are serious 
compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of 
antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States 
Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including 
those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance, which are detailed in other chapters 
of this report.
COMPLIANCE
At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties created a new 
Committee on Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern about compliance 
with the prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any 
follow-up that might be appropriate for States Parties.109
The Committee on Cooperative Compliance most recently provided a report on its 
activities to the intersessional meetings in June 2017.110 According to the report, beginning 
in January 2017, the committee met with representatives of South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and 
Yemen to continue its cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel 
mines. Previously, at the 15th Meeting of States Parties in November 2016, the president, 
in her capacity as the chair of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance presented the 
activity report of the committee’s work in 2016, which mainly comprised of dialogue with 
representatives of States Parties Sudan, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.111
In September 2017, the President of the Mine Ban Treaty, Thomas Hajnoczi, Ambassador of 
Austria to the UN, contacted Myanmar, a state not party to the treaty, regarding new mine use 
allegations. He stated, “I have asked the government of Myanmar to clarify the situation and 
consider an independent fact-finding mission with international participation into this matter. 
Any use of anti-personnel mines, an indiscriminate weapon which has dire consequences on 
civilian populations, is of grave concern to the States Parties of our Convention.”
Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties 
In this reporting period, commencing October 2016, there have been no allegations of use 
of antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. 
Until Landmine Monitor Report 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of use of 
antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became 
binding international law in 1999. That has no longer been the case since Yemen confirmed 
that its forces violated the convention by using antipersonnel mines in 2011. 
109 The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, 
clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps 
that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; 
For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if 
need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; 
Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and 
Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and 
Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-
Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf. 
110 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance, “Preliminary observations: Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance (Austria, Iraq, Peru, United Kingdom and Sweden),” 8–9 June 2017, bit.ly/
CoopCompInter2017. 
111 “Activity Report and Conclusions of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance Presented by the 
Committee on Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Chile, Peru and Sweden),” APLC/MSP.15/2016/5, 









The Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance continued to follow-up on 
past allegations of antipersonnel mine use from previous years by the armed forces of South 
Sudan (in 2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Ukraine (in 2014), and Yemen (in 2011).
Stockpile destruction
At least 157 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 
92 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 states 
that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for 
training in detection and clearance techniques). 
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 53 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 2.2 million destroyed in 2016. 
On 5 April 2017, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus confirmed in a statement that it “has 
fully fulfilled its international obligations under the Ottawa Convention,” by completing the 
destruction of “3.4 million antipersonnel mines PFM-1 with the support of the European 
Union.”112 Belarus had a deadline of 1 March 2008 to destroy all stockpiles of antipersonnel 
mines under its jurisdiction or control.
Poland completed the destruction of its stockpile in April 2016, more than a year before 
its deadline.113 Poland began destroying its stockpile of more than one million antipersonnel 
mines in 2003.114
Three States Parties possess more than 5.5 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be 
destroyed: Ukraine (4.9 million), Greece (643,267), and Oman (7,630). It is uncertain if two 
other States Parties possess stocks. Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not 
thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the 
hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is “putting forth efforts to verify 
if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.”115
Oman destroyed 3,052 antipersonnel mines during 2016.116 To date, Oman has declared 
the destruction of 4,578 antipersonnel mines, 30% of its stockpile. It has committed to 
destroy its stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.117 The Cartagena Action Plan 
2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay, 
and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to 
provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states 
to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
Complicated legal and contractual issues surrounding the destruction of Greece’s 
stockpile of antipersonnel mines continue to stall any physical destruction. This situation 
is further complicated by the stockpiles being located in both Greece and Bulgaria. Greece 
112 Statement of Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus, 5 April 2017, www.mil.by/ru/news/62864/. 
This was confirmed in the latest update at the 2017 intersessional meetings, where Belarus declared the 
destruction of approximately 3,366,500 PFM-1 series mines, as well as the previous destruction of 45,425 
PMN, 114,384 PMN-2, 57,324 POM-2, 12,799 POMZ-2, and 64,843 POMZ-2M mines. Statement of Belarus, 
Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 8–9 June 2017, bit.ly/PolandInter2017.
113 Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties,  Santiago, November–
December 2016, bit.ly/Poland15MSPGeneral.
114 Poland initially reported 1,055,971 stockpiled antipersonnel mines at the end of 2002. During 2003, 
it destroyed 58,291 POMZ-2 (2M) mines due to expiration of shelf life. It destroyed another 12,990 
stockpiled mines in 2005, again because their shelf life had expired.
115 No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which has a 
destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report 
since 2014. Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), 
Sections B, E, and G, bit.ly/MBTSomalia2013Art7. 
116 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), 8 May 2017, bit.ly/MBTOmanArt72017.
117 Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
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stated at the 2017 intersessional meetings that “the remaining stockpile will be destroyed 
over a period of 20 months after the signature of a revised contract with the MOD [Ministry 
of Defense], notwithstanding of course any future unforeseen circumstances beyond our 
control.”118
At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015 an 
additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO Support 
and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of the 
destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines. Ukraine reported the destruction 
of 652,840 mines in 2016, an increase from 19,944 destroyed mines in 2015.119 Ukraine has 
not detailed any plans to destroy stockpiled POM-2 antipersonnel mines.
The FARC in Colombia were previously known to be a major producer of antipersonnel 
mines. Disarmament of the FARC, including destruction of its antipersonnel landmine 
stockpile and components occurred under UN supervision. Disarmament was completed 
on 22 September 2017. The UN mission destroyed 3,528 antipersonnel mines formerly 
belonging to the FARC, as well as components, including more than 38,000 kilograms of 
explosives and more than 46,000 detonators.120
Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or 
mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum 
number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.” 
A total of 71 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for 
training and research purposes, of which 37 retain more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, 
Turkey, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-six States Parties 
have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 34 states that 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. On 18 September 2017, Algeria destroyed the 
5,970 antipersonnel mines it retained for training purposes after completing its landmine 
clearance program.
In addition to those listed above, another 34 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 
mines and together possess a total of 13,746 retained mines.121 This amount is 479 more 
retained mines than reported for the previous year, due to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Cambodia dropping below the 1,000-mine threshold.
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained 
antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including 
by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel 
mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain 
antipersonnel mines in this condition.122
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining 
mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States 
118 Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, June 2017, bit.ly/GreeceInter2017.
119 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2016, bit.ly/MBTArt7Ukraine2016.
120 “Misión de la ONU concluyó hoy la inhabilitación de armas de las Farc,” Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 
September 2017, www.radionacional.co/noticia/paz/mision-de-la-onu-concluye-hoy-la-inhabilitacion-
de-armas-de-las-farc.
121 BiH (982), Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), UK (724), Cambodia 
(720), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (587), South Africa (576), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Cyprus 
(440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Congo (322), Slovenia (299), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260), Argentina 
(212), Cape Verde (120), Ethiopia (107), Eritrea (101), Lithuania (100), Jordan (100), Gambia (100), Ecuador 
(90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), Burundi (4).
























Finland 16,292 (2016) 16,500 208 2016 -
Turkey 14,462 (2016) 16,000 338 2016 -
Bangladesh 12,050 (2016) 15,000 0 2013 -
Sweden 6,044 (2016) 13,948 71 2016 -
Belarus 5,989 (2016) 7,530 8 2016 -
Greece 5,650 (2016) 7,224 32 2016 -
Croatia 5,530 (2016) 17,500 57 2016 -
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 -
Tunisia 4,509 (2016) 5,000 61 2016 -
France 3,941 (2016) 4,539 14 2016 -
Yemen 3,760 (2016) 4,000 0 2008 -
Bulgaria 3,517 (2016) 10,466 6 2016 6,446
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever -
Thailand 3,339 (2016) 15,604 6 2016 4,517
Serbia 3,149 (2014) 5,000 N/R 2011 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear -
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 N/R 2009 2,524
Brazil 2,437 (2015) 17,000 N/R 2015 -
Chile 2,424 (2016) 28,647 298 2016 23,694
Romania 2,395 (2016) 4,000 0 2013 1,500
Belgium 2,288 (2016) 5,980 0 2015 -
Czech Rep. 2,217 (2016) 4,859 1 2016 -
Peru 2,015 (2016) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2015) 2,000 N/R None ever -
Canada 1,888 (2016) 1,781 8 2016 -
Denmark 1,783 (2015) 4,991 N/R 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 -
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 -
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 -
Spain 1,613 (2016) 10,000 0 2014 6,000
Netherlands 1,557 (2014) 4,076 N/R 2013 -
Mozambique 1,355 (2016) 1,427 0 2012 260
Japan 1,262 (2016) 15,000 226 2016 -
Slovakia 1,129 (2016) 7,000 18 2016 5,500
Sudan 1,124 (2016) 10,000 814 2016 -
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 -
Botswana 1,019 (2011) 1,019 N/R Unclear -
Partial total 142,595 316,595 2,166 62,798
Note: N/R = not reported.
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Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are 
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have 
been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of eight States Parties have never 
reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into 
force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken 
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Only one State Party has not submitted an initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).
As of 31 October 2017, 47% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar 
year 2016, an increase from the previous year (45%). A total of 85 States Parties have not 
submitted a report for calendar year 2016. Of this latter group, most have failed to submit 
an annual transparency report for two or more years.123
No state that is currently not party to the treaty submitted a voluntary report in 2016. 
In previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao 
PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2012 and 2013), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted 
voluntary reports. 
Iraq, Tunisia, Nigeria, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use 
of improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination 
in their annually updated Article 7 reports.
123 States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Andorra, Angola, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep of ), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, 
Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 























Demining team in Batiabombe, Democratic Republic of the Congo.



















Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, 
Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia. 
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Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
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STATUS AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS1
  Sixty-one states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine 
contamination (33 States Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas). A 
further 10 States Parties have either suspected or residual antipersonnel mine 
contamination.
  A total of about 170km2 was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2016, almost the 
same amount as in 2015. More than 232,000 antipersonnel mines were reported to 
be destroyed in 2016, an increase from the 158,000 in 2015.
  New contamination in 2016 and 2017, much of which consisted of improvised 
mine contamination, was reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen; and in states not party: India, Libya, Myanmar, 
North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. All of these states already had contamination from 
previous years. There were unconfirmed reports of new antipersonnel mine 
contamination in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Mali, Niger, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and 
Tunisia. 
  Twenty-eight States Parties have completed implementation of Article 5 since 1999. 
Algeria declared completion in February 2017.2 Mozambique, which had declared 
completion in 2015 but subsequently found previously unidentified antipersonnel 
mine contamination in 2016 and 2017, completed clearance in May 2017.3
  In 2016, three States Parties submitted extension requests that were granted at 
the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties: Ecuador, Niger, and Peru. Five States Parties 
requested extended deadlines for approval at the Sixteenth Meeting of States 
Parties in December 2017: Angola, Ecuador, Iraq, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.
  Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 due to missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline 
without having requested and been granted an extension.
  Jordan and Nigeria should declare that they have obligations under Article 5 and 
request a new deadline to complete clearance.
  Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 clearance 
deadline: Chile, DRC, Mauritania, and Peru.
MINE CONTAMINATION IN 2016
It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines, 
due to a lack of data. The extent of contamination is not known in 26 countries (seven 
States Parties, 19 states not party) and one other area. The global picture did not change 
considerably in 2016, although a number of countries, particularly States Parties, have 
continued to improve their knowledge of the extent of their contamination through the 
increased use of land release methodologies, to cancel suspected hazardous areas by non-
technical survey, and to reduce confirmed hazardous areas through technical survey.
In some states, contamination increased as a result of new use of antipersonnel mines, 
although the extent of the new contamination—particularly by improvised mines—is not 
known as survey has not been conducted. There was new contamination in 2016 and/or 
2017 in States Parties: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen; and in states not party: 
India, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. There were unconfirmed reports of
1 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which 
has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its 
resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the 
findings presented online and in its print publications.
2 Declaration of Fulfilment of Article 5, submitted by Algeria, 10 February 2017, p. 8, bit.ly/AlgeriaDecl2017.
3 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form I. Four small suspected mined areas 
with a combined size of 1,881m2 remained submerged under water. These areas are “suspended” and 
Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded and access can be gained. See, 
Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, 

















new antipersonnel mine contamination in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Mali, Niger, Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. (See the Ban Policy chapter for details.)
Several of the states for which no estimate is provided are heavily or massively 
contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea 
and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the 
DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data is available on 
Estimated extent of mine contamination at end of 2016
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Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics. 
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.
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the extent of contamination.4 Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have widespread 
contamination, but the extent is not known.
Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Algeria,5 Cameroon,6 Djibouti,7 
Kuwait,8 Mali,9 Moldova,10 Namibia,11 Palau,12 the Philippines,13 and Tunisia.14
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2016
Total global clearance of landmines in 2016 was about 170km2, with at least 232,000 
antipersonnel mines destroyed. However, this is an underestimation, as some actors, such as 
the army, police, or commercial operators, may not systematically 
report clearance results. Moreover, in some states, informal 
clearance or community-based clearance has been conducted, 
which is not subject to quality management and entry into the 
national databases. For further details of land release results, 
both survey and clearance, see individual country profiles on the 
Monitor website.15
No mine clearance occurred in States Parties Ethiopia 
and Serbia. Only survey was conducted in Mauritania and 
Mozambique. In Cyprus, 0.01km2 was cleared but only antivehicle 
mines were found.16 Oman reported that it cleared a mined area 
but did not report the size or the number and type of mines that 
were destroyed.17 In Somalia, 0.04km2 was cleared but no mines 
or UXO were found.18 In Western Sahara, no areas containing 
antipersonnel mines were cleared in 2016 east of the berm.19
4 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-
Hoon, “Find One Million: War With Landmines,” Korea Times, 3 June 2010.
5 The north of Algeria is said to be contaminated by an unknown number of improvised mines laid by 
insurgent groups. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 2017, p. 22.
6 In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines have been reported.
7 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a 
military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be 
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not 
made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
8 Antipersonnel mine casualties were reported in Kuwait in 2016.
9 In Mali, casualties have been reported to be caused by improvised mines. It has been reported that these 
mines may be activated upon contact or by the weight of a person, although they have only been reported 
to have been activated either by vehicles or command detonated.
10 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested 
it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic 
of Transnistria, where it continues to assert is jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 2 June 2008, bit.ly/
MoldovaNSA2008.
11 Despite a statement made by Namibia at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance 
with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for 
example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
12 Palau may have residual antipersonnel mine contamination.
13 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent 
years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas. 
14 There have been casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Tunisia in 2015, 
2016, and 2017. Due to the nature of the ongoing conflict, it is likely that these devices were recently laid.
15 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
16 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS), 24 July 2017.
17 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), bit.ly/MBTArt7reports.
18 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
19 Email from Virginie Auger, UNMAS, 29 March 2017.
Mine risk education at a camp for internally 
displaced persons from Mosul, Iraq.


















Clearance of mined area in 2016





Iraq 27.36 17,113 Data discrepancies, large areas 
cleared with little contamination, 
and incomplete reporting
Cambodia 26.7 7,578 There are discrepancies between 
data sources
Algeria N/R 62,589 Reported release of 28km2 but 
did not specify how much was 
clearance
Chile 3.5 N/R Number of AP mines destroyed 
not reported
Turkey 3.4 9,422 Not all clearance results were 
reported
Yemen 3 16,440
South Sudan 2.6 585 There are discrepancies between 
data sources
Sri Lanka 2.3 59,304
Zimbabwe 1.7 23,193
Jordan 1.4 100 Areas verified
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH)
1.3 1,313 There are discrepancies between 
data sources




Israel 0.9 4,313 Area cleared by the Israeli 
Defense Force is unknown
Azerbaijan 0.8 17 All AP mines were destroyed 
during battle area clearance, only 
AV mines were found in the mined 
areas
Lebanon 0.6 501 There are discrepancies between 
data sources
Chad 0.6 96 This total area includes area 
reduced by technical survey
Tajikistan 0.5 1,248 There are discrepancies between 
data sources
United Kingdom 0.4 1,807 Between October and December 
2016; results for beginning of 





No clearance or survey results were 
reported for States Parties Eritrea and 
Nigeria, and for states not party China, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,20 Syria, and 
Uzbekistan. 
Of the 10 states that are massively 
contaminated with more than 100km2 of 
mine contamination, three reported very low 
clearance results of less than 1km2 in 2016: 
States Parties Chad and Thailand, and state 
not party Azerbaijan.
20 In its CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V transparency reports for 2016, Russia reported that its 
armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in 80 regions 
of the country. In total, more than 306,616 explosive devices were destroyed, including 20,698 IEDs. See, 
CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2016), 
Form A. However, it did not report how much was mined area and how many antipersonnel mines were 
destroyed.
State/area Mined area cleared (km2)
Antipersonnel 
mines destroyed Notes
South Korea 0.2 134 Did not report type of mines 
destroyed
Kosovo 0.2 40 Slight discrepancy between data 
sources
Democratic Republic  
of the Congo (DRC)
0.2 33 There are discrepancies between 
data sources
Nagorno-Karabakh 0.1 117
Ukraine 0.05 4 Clearance results not available for 
national operators
Palestine 0.03 24 Slight discrepancies between data 
sources
Senegal 0.03 20 Conflicting figures provided by 
mine action center
Peru 0.02 1,886 Number of mines destroyed 
between April 2016 and March 
2017





Lao PDR 0 112 No systematic clearance. Figure 
includes AP and AV mines 
Morocco See note 288 An improbable 283km2 of cleared 
area reported
Vietnam 0 3 Mines destroyed during survey
Total global clearance 169.84 232,702
Note: AP mines = antipersonnel mines; AV mines = antivehicle mines; N/R = not reported.











2016 170 232,702 29,000
2015 171 157,672 14,000
2014 201 231,708 11,500
2013 185 275,000 4,500
2012 200 240,000 9,300


















States and other stakeholders in humanitarian demining paid particular attention in 2016 
and 2017 to the increasing prevalence of improvised mines, and the specific challenges they 
pose to the mine action community in meeting the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty, and 
in protecting civilians during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including emergency 
humanitarian crises.
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device produced in an improvised manner 
incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine.21 
They fall under the Mine Ban Treaty, therefore affected states are required to report on such 
contamination in their Article 7 transparency reports and to clear it in accordance with 
Article 5. These devices are frequently known as improvised mines.
Improvised mines are not new and have been found in many countries for decades. The 
countries mentioned here do not comprise an exhaustive list, so the true extent of global 
improvised mine contamination is probably more widespread.22 In 2016 and 2017, large 
quantities of improvised mine contamination and/or numerous incidents and casualties were 
reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, 
Ukraine, and Yemen. In addition, improvised mines were occasionally found in the following 
States Parties: Algeria, Somalia, and Turkey.23 There are unconfirmed reports of improvised 
antipersonnel mine use in Cameroon and Mali.
Improvised mine contamination has also been identified in the following states not party 
in 2016 and 2017: India, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Syria.24
No data exists on the extent of improvised mine contamination in any state.25 In 
Afghanistan, a “preliminary survey” in 2016 identified about 220km2 of newly contaminated 
land affected by pressure-plate IEDs, which are landmines. This data needed further non-
technical survey and had not been entered into the Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) or reported in Afghanistan’s Article 7 report.26 UNMAS/the Directorate 
of Mine Action (DMAC) believes the number of devices is far fewer than the number of 
mass-produced mines, however acknowledges that amid Afghanistan’s continuing conflict, 
comprehensive survey of improvised mines is impossible.27 Colombia reports a national 
estimate of 51km2 of mine contamination, which is largely improvised mines, although it 
has yet to establish a national baseline.28 In 2016, Iraq reported 6.67 km2 of improvised mine 
contamination, which is far less than the actual extent of contamination.29
21 See the glossary at the beginning of this report and in the Casualties chapter for definitions of IEDs and 
improvised mines. 
22 Danish Demining Group (DDG) calculated that an estimated 67% of the countries where DDG is present 
also have an IED problem. See, Robert Keeley, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IED): A Humanitarian Mine 
Perspective,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 21.1, April 2017, p. 5.
23 For further details, see individual country profiles on mine action and casualties on the Monitor website, 
www.the-monitor.org. 
24 Ibid.
25 According to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “The scale of the IED 
problem remains poorly defined, although evidence to data suggests that the largest numbers of devices 
are associated with mass-produced improvised landmines. Numbers of booby traps and command wire/
radio controlled devices in urban areas should become clearer as more operations take place in liberated 
towns and villages, and as more data becomes available. Until such information does become available, it 
is hard to predict the relative levels of effort required to address different types of IED and the associated 
equipment, competence and cost implications.” GICHD, “An initial study into mine action and improvised 
explosive devices,” February 2017, p. 49.
26 Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, Director, Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC), in Geneva, 9 February 2017; 
and Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), “Operational Work Plan 1396,” undated but 2017, p. 2.
27 “MAPA Operational Work Plan 1396,” undated but 2017, p. 22.
28 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form D, bit.ly/MBTArt7reports.
29 Data received from Ahmed Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 6 April 2017.
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There has been increased discussion on appropriate policies, practices, and techniques 
for addressing IEDs, including improvised mines. During 2016 and 2017, articles and reports 
have been produced regarding the issue by actors such as the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and published in the 
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction.30
States Parties have a number of obligations with regards to improvised mines. Affected 
States Parties must report any confirmed or suspected improvised antipersonnel mine 
contamination in their Article 7 transparency reports. Resources must be made available to 
assess the extent of contamination and develop appropriate strategies to address it. States 
Parties should exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing 
improvised mines. Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the related costs 
of equipment and resources related to dealing with improvised mines, which may be higher 
than dealing with manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress 
towards meeting any Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance 
with the Mine Ban Treaty.
MINE BAN TREATY ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel 
mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. 
States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations 
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.
COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION
On 10 February 2017, Algeria announced that it had completed clearance.31





























*Montenegro still has to formally report completion of Article 5 implementation, but is not believed to 
have any antipersonnel mine contamination left.
In 2015, Mozambique declared completion of clearance, but additional contamination 
was found and subsequently cleared in 2016–2017.32
30 GICHD, “An initial study into mine action and improvised explosive devices,” February 2017; MAG, “Why 
Principles Matter. Humanitarian Mine Action and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),” Policy Brief, May 
2017; Robert Keeley, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IED): A Humanitarian Mine Perspective,” The Journal of 
Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 21.1, April 2017; Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton, “MAG: Clearing 
Improvised Landmines in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 21.1; and Abigail 
Jones, “Do no harm: the challenge of protecting civilians from the IED threat in south-central Somalia,” 
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 21.1, April 2017.
31 Declaration of Completion of Implementation Article 5, submitted by Algeria, 10 February 2017, p. 8, bit.
ly/AlgeriaDecl2017.
32 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form I. Four small suspected mined areas 
with a combined size of 1,881m2 remained submerged under water. These areas are “suspended” and 
Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded and access can be gained. See, 
Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, 

















In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of 
known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 
before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
Jordan33 has declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty (in 2012) but is 
still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore does not appear in the table 
above. Nigeria34 declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports 
of new contamination resulting from recent use of antipersonnel mines by a non-state armed 
group. It therefore does not appear in the table above.
PROGRESS ON MEETING DEADLINES
As of October 2017, only four States Parties appear on track to meet their clearance deadlines, 
while 17 appear not to be on track, and the status of two is unclear. Five States Parties 
are awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2017. One State Party has 
missed its deadline and is in violation of the treaty. Two States Parties that have declared 
completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and should 
request new deadlines. 
The assessments of the status of each State Party regarding the fulfilment of Article 
5 obligations are made through consideration of several factors, including the remaining 
challenge and the extent to which it is known, clearance rates, mine action capacity and 
assets, funding prospects, and the existence of any conflict and insecurity problems.
In 2016, three States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete 
their Article 5 obligations which were granted at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2016.
  Ecuador submitted an extension request due to unforeseen circumstances resulting 
from the earthquake in 2016 preventing it from meeting its deadline.35 States Parties 
granted the requested three-month extension until 31 December 2017 and asked 
Ecuador to submit a detailed request by 31 March 2017,36 which it did (see below).
  Niger requested until 31 December 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all 
mined areas.37 In granting the request, States Parties noted that the request did 
not contain a detailed annual workplan with benchmarks for progress leading to 
completion. The meeting noted that monthly and annual projections could support 
Niger’s efforts in mobilizing financial and technical resources. States Parties asked 
Niger to provide a revised workplan by 30 April 2017, in addition to annual progress 
reports.38 Niger had not submitted an updated workplan as of October 2017.
  Peru requested until 31 December 2024 to complete survey and clearance, noting 
the difficulties of the terrain and the acquisition of data on additional contaminated 
areas through information exchanges with Ecuador.39 In granting the request, States 
Parties noted that improvements to its land release methodology could result in 
Peru proceeding with faster implementation. They asked Peru to provide by 30 April 
2018 an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension.40
33 Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, APLC/MSP.12/2012/Misc.3, Geneva, 4 December 
2012.
34 Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, APLC/MSP.14/2015/Misc.2, Geneva, 16 
December 2015.
35 Letter from Efraín Baus Palacios, Director of Neighbourhood Relations and Sovereignty for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, and President of the National Humanitarian Demining Center of 
Ecuador, to Amb. Patricia O’Brian, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN in Geneva, and Chair of 
the Article 5 Committee, Note No. 14839-DRVS/CENDESMI, Quito, 26 November 2016.
36 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, 14 December 2016, p. 8, bit.ly/
MBTMSP15Final.
37 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, dated 15 May 2016, submitted 15 April 2016, p. 13.
38 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, 14 December 2016, p. 6.
39 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), dated July 2016, submitted 2 August 2016.
40 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, 14 December 2016, p. 7.
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States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of 
any deadline extensions as of October 2017
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years 1 March 2023 Not on track
Angola 1 January 
2013
5 years 1 January 2018 Extension request 
submitted to 2025
Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years 1 March 2020 No change since 
extension granted 
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Cambodia 1 January 
2010
10 years 1 January 2020 Not on track
Chad 1 November 
2009
14 months (1st 
extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)
1 January 2020 Not on track
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years 1 March 2020 On track
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years 1 March 2021 Not on track
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
1 July 2019 No change since 
extension granted
DRC 1 November 
2012
26 months (1st 
extn.)
6 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 On track
Ecuador 1 October 
2009
8 years (1st extn.)
3 months (2nd extn.)
31 December 2017 Extension request 
submitted to 2022
Eritrea 1 February 
2012
3 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 February 2020 Not on track
Ethiopia 1 June 2015 5 years 1 June 2020 Not on track
Iraq 1 February 
2018
N/A N/A Extension request 
submitted to 2028
Jordan 1 May 2009 3 years
Declared 
completion in 2012, 
but contamination 
still found
1 May 2012 Should submit extension 
request
Mauritania 1 January 
2011
5 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 On track
Niger 1 September 
2009
N/A* (1st extn.)
1 year (2nd extn.)
4 years (3rd extn.)
31 December 2020 Unclear
Nigeria 1 March 2012 Declared 
completion in 2011, 
but contamination 
still found
Should submit extension 
request



















In 2017, five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to compete their 
Article 5 obligations, for approval at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December:
  Angola requested until 1 January 2025 with the goal of eliminating 1,461 mined 
areas.41 The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Angola did not 
provide annual projections of mined areas to be addressed. Angola indicated that 
once the dimension of the problem and its extent are more accurately identified 
it would be possible to plan more realistic activities, and identify the necessary 
resources in order the eliminate the problem.42
  Ecuador submitted an extension request until 31 December 2022.43 Ecuador stated 
that it was requesting an additional five years to clear the remaining 0.1km2 of 
mined areas because mechanical assets cannot be used in these areas and operating 
conditions are very challenging.44
41 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, dated 31 March 2017, submitted 11 May 2017, p. 20. 
The areas comprised of 1,074 confirmed areas, corresponding to 104km2, and 287 suspected hazardous 
areas, corresponding to 141km2.
42 “Preliminary observations,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 
Implementation, 8–9 June 2017, pt. 46.
43 Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Request for renewal of extension of the deadline to complete the 
destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines 
and on their Destruction,” March 2017. 
44 Additional information to Ecuador’s Extension Request, 8 September 2017.
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Peru 1 March 2009 8 years (1st extn.)
7 years 8 months 
(2nd extn.)
31 December 2024 On track
Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2021 Not on track
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Somalia 1 October 
2022
N/A N/A Not on track
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A N/A Not on track
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years 1 April 2019 Not on track
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years 1 April 2020 Not on track
Thailand 1 May 2009 9.5 years 1 November 2018 Extension request 
submitted to 2023
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years 1 March 2022 Not on track 
Ukraine 1 June 2016 N/A N/A Should submit extension 
request
United Kingdom 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2020 Not on track
Zimbabwe 1 March 2009 22 months (1st 
extn.)
2 years (2nd extn.)
2 years (3rd extn.)
3 years (4th extn.)
1 January 2018 Extension request 
submitted to December 
2025
Note: N/A = not applicable.
* Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure for mined areas 
discovered after the expiration of the state’s Article 5 deadline.
42 
  Iraq submitted an extension request until 1 February 2028.45 The ICBL noted that it is 
understandable that Iraq has submitted a request for 10 years due to the magnitude 
of contamination and security challenges. However, it stated, “As has been done for 
other States Parties in the past, we recommend that Iraq be granted only the amount 
of time necessary to prepare a plan.. .A shorter extension period would enable Iraq 
to better assess the scale of contamination once it is possible to access areas that 
are currently inaccessible, before presenting a long-term plan.”46
  Thailand submitted an extension request until 1 November 2023 to complete 
survey and clearance of all mined areas.47 As of July 2017, Thailand had 409.73km2 
remaining to be addressed.48 It expects that up to 86.5% may be cancelled through 
non-technical survey.49
  Zimbabwe submitted an extension request until December 2025 to complete survey 
and clearance of all mined areas.50 The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted 
that the request contained an updated workplan with milestones to be met over the 
course of the extension period.51 Zimbabwe stated that an eight-year National Mine 
Action Plan was in the process of being finalized and, once approved, would be 
provided as an annex to the extension request.52
Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline. The 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties expressed serious concern that Ukraine is in a situation 
of non-compliance with Article 5. It called on Ukraine to submit as soon as possible a 
request for extension, and it welcomed the commitment by Ukraine to continue to engage 
with the Committee on Article 5 Implementation.53 At the intersessional meetings in June 
2017, Ukraine said that it would start implementing Article 5 once the integrity of the whole 
territory is restored.54 As of October 2017, Ukraine had still not submitted an extension 
request.
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF STATES PARTIES 
AGAINST THEIR ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AND THE 
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN
In the Maputo Action Plan, adopted at the Third Review Conference on 27 June 2014, States 
Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations 
with the urgency that the completion work requires.”55 Actions #8, #9, and #11 relate to 
clearance.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented its preliminary observations at 
the intersessional meetings in June 2017, reporting on 25 States Parties that had submitted 
information by that date.56
45 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 28 August 2017.
46 Statement of the ICBL on Iraq’s Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 
June 2017.
47 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), dated 30 March 2017, 8 September 2017.
48 Ibid., executive summary.
49 Ibid., p. 12.
50 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017.
51 “Preliminary observations,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 
Implementation, 8–9 June 2017, pt. 287.
52 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017, p. 19.
53 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, 14 December 2016, p. 8.
54 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 
Geneva, 8 June 2017.
55 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.


















The assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the 
committee’s observations and Landmine Monitor’s review of the progress of States Parties.
Maputo Action Plan Action #8: quantification and qualification of remaining 
contamination challenge
Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the 
remaining contamination challenge. Only four States Parties have a clear understanding of 
the remaining contamination: Chile, Ecuador, Mauritania, and the UK. Twelve States Parties 
have a good knowledge of the locations of confirmed and suspected contamination but survey 
is needed to clarify the actual extent of contamination within 
those areas: Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, 
Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen 
States Parties have reported on known contaminated areas, but 
do not have a complete picture of the extent of contamination, 
as there are areas that have not been surveyed: Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. In addition, 
DRC may have contaminated areas that have not yet been 
identified. Eritrea has not provided an update on estimated 
extent of contamination since the end of 2013. Two States 
Parties have not formally reported the locations of any mined 
areas, Nigeria and Oman.
The committee assessed the degree of clarity of the 
remaining challenge, finding that only 10 of the 25 States 
Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their 
reporting: Afghanistan, Angola, Cyprus, Mauritania, Serbia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. This compared 
to seven of 17 States Parties in 2015.
Maputo Action Plan Action #9: application of land release methodologies 
Afghanistan and Angola are in the process of conducting nationwide surveys. In Angola, 
this has resulted in the cancellation of, on average, 90% of suspected contaminated areas.57 
Five States Parties used non-technical survey in 2016 to cancel large amounts of suspected 
mined area, and thus greatly decrease their estimate of remaining contamination: Angola, 
BiH, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Sudan. Non-technical and technical survey were 
also used to better define the extent of contamination in Afghanistan, Colombia, Croatia, 
Cyprus, DRC, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
the UK, and Zimbabwe. In 2016, Jordan was in the process of verifying areas for missing 
mines.58 Colombia’s strategic plan for 2016–2021 aims to establish a national baseline of 
contamination.59
In Somalia, no nationwide survey has been conducted, mainly due to the security 
situation.60 Continuous conflict in Yemen since March 2015 has prevented systematic survey.
In Chile and Niger, no survey was conducted, only clearance.61 Ethiopia did not conduct 
57 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 5.
58 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), p. 4; and email from Mohammad Breikat, 
National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR), 10 April 2017.
59 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form D.
60 UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia,” undated.  
61 Chile, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F2; and Analysis of Niger’s Third 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 25 October 2016.
A mine detection rat receives a reward 
for identifying a mine during training in 
Cambodia.
© Simon Guillemin/APOPO, March 2016
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survey or systematic clearance.62 No survey or clearance was conducted in Serbia in 2016.63 
Four other States Parties did not report any results of land release or confirmation of mined 
areas through survey in 2016: Cameroon, Eritrea, Nigeria, and Oman. 
Turkey did not report the results of its comprehensive desk assessment of minefield records 
of the eastern and Syrian borders conducted in 2016.64 Algeria reported the release of 28km2, 
but did not specify how much was cleared and how much was released through survey.65
Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2016 
used land release methodologies (survey and clearance), although the degree to which they 
were aligned with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) varies. The committee called 
on States Parties to align their national mine action standards with the revised IMAS, if they 
have not already done so.66
Maputo Action Plan Action #11: on-time submission of high-quality requests
In 2017, five states submitted requests on time: Angola, Ecuador, Iraq, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. 
The level of quality of the requests varied greatly. All five requests included information 
on progress made so far, and some form of political commitment to complete the task of 
mine clearance. Some lacked the key components that would characterize high-quality 
requests: consistent data, detailed plans for land release activities during the extension 
period, and milestones to measure progress.
The extension request process in 2017 demonstrated the value of exchanges between 
requesting states, the Committee on Article 5 implementation, and other stakeholders. 
Indeed, all requesting states submitted either revised requests or additional information in 
the course of the process, some of which was of significantly improved quality.
Jordan, Nigeria, and Ukraine should submit extension requests to address the contamination 
that has been identified, either new or previously existing, after they declared completion of 
clearance or after their deadline has passed.
Maputo Action Plan Action #25: annual submission of high-quality and  
updated information
As of October 2017, Article 7 transparency reports for 2016 were still outstanding for 
four mine-contaminated States Parties: Eritrea, Nigeria, Niger, and Somalia. Twelve were 
outstanding in the same month of 2016.
(See the table “Clearance of mined area in 2016” above for notes about the quality of 
information provided on clearance by individual states.)
OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING CLEARANCE OPERATIONS
Funding
Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 implementation deadlines 
by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Iraq, Niger, Serbia, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
Although DRC can achieve its Article 5 deadline, it reported funding difficulties.
62 Statement of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 
Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form G.
63 Email from Slađana Košutić, Serbian Mine Action Center (SMAC), 6 April 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 
7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.
64 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form A; and statement of Turkey, Mine Ban 
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Victim Assistance, Geneva, 8 June 2017.
65 Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by Algeria, 10 February 2017, p. 8, bit.
ly/AlgeriaDecl2017.
66 “Preliminary observations,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 


















Almost all Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with contamination have a national mine action 
program or institutions that are assigned to fulfil the state’s clearance obligations. In Turkey, 
the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) was established in 2015, but political events in 
2016 resulted in institutional changes. A capacity needs assessment was conducted in 2016 
to form the basis for future capacity development.67 
Ukraine is taking steps toward the establishment of a national mine action program.68
In Afghanistan in October 2016, UNMAS formally handed leadership of the Mine Action 
Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) to the Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC).69 The UN Mine 
Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) changed 
its name to “UNMAS in support of DMAC” (UNMAS/
DMAC) in November 2016.70 In DRC, UNMAS 
reported that the transfer of responsibility to the 
Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais 
de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) was completed in early 
2016.71 In South Sudan, the National Mine Action 
Authority (NMAA) reported that the transition 
from UN to national ownership was suspended 
and that NMAA lacked the basic means to fulfil its 
functions.72
States Parties Nigeria and Oman do not have 
national mine action programs.
In contrast, fewer than half of states not party 
have functioning mine action programs.73 There 
were no new mine action programs established 
among states not party in 2016. The following 12 
states not party do not have national mine action 
programs: China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, India, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
South Korea, Syria, and Uzbekistan. Egypt’s mine clearance program is not functioning74 
and the status of Iran’s mine action center is not clear. Some of these states not party are 
among the most contaminated countries in the world. Yet the understanding of the extent 
of contamination, and the scale of land release efforts, is much lower than in States Parties. 
This underlines the importance of striving for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in 
order to address the threat posed by antipersonnel mines.
All the other areas (Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Western Sahara) have mine action centers. 
67 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H; statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty 
Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance, Geneva, 8 June 
2017; and email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, TURMAC, 21 June 2017.
68 “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th International 
Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 17 February 2016.
69 Interviews with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 9 February 2017; and with Yngvil Foss, 
Country Programme Manager, UNMAS, in Geneva, 6 February 2017.
70 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Chief of Staff, UNMAS/DMAC, 16 May 2017.
71 UNMAS, “About UNMAS Support of One UN and the GODRC,” March 2016, www.mineaction.org/print/
programmes/drc.
72 Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, in Geneva, 6 September 2017.
73 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
74 In January 2017, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, Sahar Nasr, announced the establishment 
of the National Centre for Landmine Action and Sustainable Development. Minister Nasr said that the 
center would begin clearing 600km2 on the northern coast and would also establish infrastructure 
after clearance was completed. See, H. Salah, “Establishment of National Center for Mines Action and 
Sustainable Development completed: Nasr,” Daily News Egypt, 23 January 2017, www.dailynewsegypt.
com/2017/01/23/612214/.
A deminer works a minefield near the village of Balincë, 
Kosovo.
© Emanuele Amighetti/HALO Trust, January 2017
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Clearance in conflict
In 2016 and 2017, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties (Afghanistan, 
Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) and 
four states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria). Insecurity has also restricted 
access to some areas that are or may be antipersonnel mine-affected in DRC,75 Ethiopia,76 
Jordan,77 Senegal,78 Tajikistan,79 Turkey,80 and Western Sahara. In Tajikistan, in 2015 and 2016, 
survey and clearance operations were restricted on the border with Afghanistan due to 
insecurity. However, improved security conditions in 2017 enabled full survey and clearance 
operations to resume.81
In South Sudan, a resurgence in violence forced mine action operations to close in the 
second half of 2016.82
In Libya and Syria, where there is limited clearance capacity, international mine action 
clearance operators continued to focus their efforts on capacity building and training of 
national actors, much of it taking place outside the country.83 In Ukraine, the State Emergency 
Services (SESU), which is responsible for humanitarian demining, suffered severe losses of 
buildings and vehicles during the conflict. The Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator and Danish Demining Group (DDG) provided the SESU 
with equipment and training in 2016 to support their operational capacity.84
In 2016, a number of security incidents directly affected demining activities, several resulting 
in casualties. In Afghanistan in 2016, nine deminers were killed and 10 injured in attacks by 
armed groups.85 In Chad, a number of deminers were killed and injured in mine blasts during 
missions in the north, east, and west of the country.86 In Colombia in 2017, Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA) staff had to leave an area due to direct threats from a dissident FARC faction.87 
In Somalia in 2016, two demining staff were killed and one injured in a shooting incident, 
reportedly due to a conflict between rival sub-clans that was not directly targeted at demining 
75 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 10; and UNMAS, “2015 
Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Democratic Republic of the Congo,” undated.
76 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 
deadline Extension Request,” 26 September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension 
Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.
77 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), p. 4; and email from Mohammad Breikat, NCDR, 
10 April 2017.
78 Email from Ibrahima Seck, Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines, 
CNAMS), 22 August 2016.
79 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 19 August 2016, 
and 22 May 2017; and from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 14 March 2017; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine 
Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.
80 Email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, TURMAC, 21 June 2017.
81 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016, and 22 May 2017; and from Aubrey 
Sutherland, NPA, 14 March 2017; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States 
Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.
82 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: 
South Sudan,” undated.
83 Email from Lyuba Guerassimova, Programme Officer, UNMAS Libya, 28 February 2017; Implementing 
Partners Coordination Meeting, Tunis, 19 January 2017; emails from Lutz Kosewsky, DDG, 22 February 
2017; and from Catherine Smith, Handicap International (HI), 22 February 2017; and interview with Luke 
Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, and Nour Saleh, Project Officer, Mayday Rescue, and Majid 
Khalaf, EOD Liaison Officer, Syria Civil Defense (SCD), in Geneva, 5 September 2017.
84 Emails from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May and 17 June 2016; and from Anton Shevchenko, 
OSCE, 14 June 2016.
85 Email from Feda Mohammad Oriakhil, Project Officer, DMAC, 30 September 2017.
86 “Tchad: grève des démineurs restés 10 mois sans salaire” (“Chad: deminers strike after 10 months without 
pay”), Agence de Presse Africaine, 10 May 2017, http://mobile.apanews.net/index.php/fr/news/tchad-greve-
des-demineurs-restes-10-mois-sans-salaire; and email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2017.

















operations, but which nevertheless forced HALO to withdraw from the areas.88 In South Sudan 
in 2016, three mine action staff were killed and three injured during shooting incidents.89
Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated areas. In 
Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas are in 
zones controlled by Israel or under joint control. Ukraine has noted that it does not currently 
have access to some mined areas. In Azerbaijan, Armenian forces occupy a significant area 
of the country where considerable contamination exists.90 In Georgia, there may be mined 
areas in South Ossetia, however, South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and 
is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international NGOs.
In Western Sahara, the expulsion of civilian staff members of the UN Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by Morocco resulted in the suspension of UNMAS-
contracted demining activities east of the berm from 20 March to 15 September 2016.91
In Myanmar, the government said that concluding a National Ceasefire Agreement with 
non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding with survey and clearance.92
Finally, and on a positive note, in Colombia, the peace process between the government 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) gave momentum to demining 
planning. In 2016, as the first step in the process of implementing an agreement between 
the government and the FARC on demining, NPA has been leading and supervising a mine 
clearance project as a trust-building exercise. The Colombian army has been conducting 
the mine clearance as such, with NPA providing verification, while the FARC has given 
information on contaminated areas.93 On 1 October 2017, a ceasefire agreement between 
the government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN) took effect.94 In the agreement, the ELN has committed not use 
antipersonnel landmines that could endanger the civilian population.
88 Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
89 Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Danish Refugee Council, “Two national employees 
have lost their lives in South Sudan,” 12 April 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/two-national-
employees-have-lost-their-lives-south-sudan; and emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017, and 21 
October 2016.
90 Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” 
undated, p. 5.
91 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 
April 2017, p. 8; R. Gladstone, “Morocco Orders U.N. to Cut Staff in Disputed Western Sahara Territory,” The 
New York Times, 17 March 2016, bit.ly/NYTMoroccoUNWesternS2016; and What’s in Blue: Insights on the 
work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO 
Adoption,” 26 April 2016, bit.ly/WhatsInBlue26Apr2016.
92 Roger Fasth and Pascal Simon, “Mine Action in Myanmar,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 19.2, July 2015.
93 Email from Fredrik Holmegaard, Project Manager, Humanitarian Disarmament – Colombia, NPA, 13 June 
2016.






































Mapping a suspected mine hazard during non-technical survey training in Colombia.










High numbers of casualties were recorded in 2016, with a total of at least 8,605 people 
killed or injured by landmines, including improvised landmines, as well as unexploded 
cluster submunitions,1 and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth 
mines/ERW.2
This was another increase in the number of recorded casualties, following the sharp rise 
in 2015 when there were 6,967 casualties.3
This continued increase in 2016 was largely a result of more mine/ERW casualties 
recorded in countries experiencing armed conflict. The casualty total in 2016 is the second 
highest of all years in Monitor data except for 1999—the first year of Monitor recording. 
It also marked the highest number of casualties caused by improvised mines on record 
for the Monitor.
Of the total of 8,605 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2016, at least 2,089 
people were killed and another 6,491 people were injured; for 25 casualties, it was not 
known if the person survived or was killed. 
1 Casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions (unexploded submunitions), which are cluster munition 
remnants, are included in the Monitor global mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data. 
Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are 
reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by 
unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2016, see 
ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/cluster-munition-
monitor-2017/casualties.aspx.
2 For more information on explosive items recorded in casualty Monitor data, see the table “Mine/ERW 
types causing casualties,” at the end of this casualties overview.
3 Landmine Monitor 2016 cited a figure of 6,461 mine/ERW casualties for 2015, however the number of 
casualties for 2015 and past years has been adjusted with newly available data.
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Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2016)4
Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties compared to military and security 
forces,5 where the civilian status was known, continuing a clear trend of civilian harm over 
time: 78% of casualties were civilians in 2016, comparable to 79% in 2015.6
Declining casualty rates were recorded in Cambodia and Colombia in 2016, two States 
Parties that in the past were among those with the highest number of casualties. For the 
first time—since annual recording started for Cambodia in 1994 and since the year 2000 for 
Colombia—both recorded fewer than 100 casualties each. 
Casualties were identified in a total of 56 states and other areas in 2016.7
Overall, in 2016 casualties decreased in 31 states and areas from 2015,8 remained the 
same in another four9 and increased in 30 states.10 Of these, five countries (Afghanistan, 
Libya, Myanmar, Ukraine, and Yemen) accounted for 85% of the cumulative annual increase 
in recorded casualties from 2015.11
With continued increases in casualties each year since 2013, the total of 8,605 mine/ERW 
casualties recorded in 2016 mirrored the high casualty numbers documented in the early 
years of the Mine Ban Treaty. This is reflected in an average incidence rate of 23 mine/ERW 
casualties per day in 2016, compared to less than 10 casualties per day in 2013, the year for 
which the lowest number of annual casualties were recorded by the Monitor. In 1999, there 
4 Previous annual totals are adjusted based on newly available data.
5 The category “military and security forces” includes police as well as members of non-state armed groups 
and militia.
6 For 2016, the civilian status was not recorded in data for 3,576 of the reported casualties. For 2015, the 
Monitor recorded 3,412 civilian casualties of 4,340 with known civilian status.
7 In 2016, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, 
South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and four other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western 
Sahara. See table at the end of this chapter.
8 A total decrease of 1,078 from updated 2015 numbers: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Zimbabwe, and other areas Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.
9 With a total of 23 casualties in 2016: Israel, Sri Lanka, and other areas Kosovo and Somaliland.
10 A total increase of 2,716 from updated 2015 numbers: Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, BiH, Cameroon, Chad, 
Chile, Croatia, DRC, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.
11 These countries made up an increase of 2,316 casualties among the 2,716 total for all countries recording 


















































was an average of 25 mine/ERW casualties per day. The similarity is also echoed in the many 
casualties not disaggregated by the mine or ERW device type. 
Largest increases in mine/ERW casualties 2015–2016
In the first years of the Mine Ban Treaty, it was certain that many casualties went 
unrecorded. In 1999, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties, but estimates indicated 
that there were another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties that were not recorded in the 
available data. From 1999 through 2006 the estimated number of new mine casualties 
(recorded and estimated) each year was between 15,000 and 20,000. The Monitor estimated 
that there have been approximately 1,000 additional casualties (an additional 25–30% of 
the total) each year between 2009 and 2014 that are not captured in its global mine/ERW 
casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing 
conflict. However, with the highly irregular accessibility of data for countries experiencing 
conflict in 2015 and 2016, estimating the gaps has become less viable as has the ability to 
disaggregate casualties by device type.
The Monitor has recorded more than 110,000 mine/ERW casualties for the 17-year period 
since its global tracking began in 1999,12 including at least 80,000 new survivors.13 Mine/
ERW incidents impact not only the direct casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who 
were killed, as well as the survivors—but also members of their families struggling under 
new physical, psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous years, there was no 
substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/
ERW casualties.
Of the total casualties in 2016, 66% (5,715) occurred in 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban 
Treaty.14
CASUALTY RECORDING FOR 2016
As in previous years, the mine/ERW casualties identified in 2016 only include recorded 
casualties, not estimates. It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that 
are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring 
12 From 1999 through 2016, 112,646 mine/ERW casualties were recorded, including 28,597 people killed, 
80,025 injured, and 4,024 for whom the survival or the fatal outcome of the explosive incident was not 
known.
13 A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
14 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2016: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, 
BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
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in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, 
numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly 
higher in those countries.
The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, 
and global, dataset of casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2016 included 
datasets or reporting from the following types of sources: international organizations, UN 
and national mine action centers, other UN agencies, humanitarian mine action operators, 
ICBL members, and other NGOs, as well as media scanning.15
Mines, including improvised mines, and other ERW remain a menace to civilians, often 
including the most vulnerable and marginalized people in their countries and communities. 
Their fate typically does not always make it into headlines and newsfeeds. While the 
monitor draws on media scanning in several languages as well as other publicly available 
documentation, access to a broad variety of other sources is vital when compiling a global 
overview of the harm caused. This is why the Monitor relies on the many sources and data 
providers listed above.
In 2016, significant underreporting of casualties for Iraq continued to be apparent. 
This seems to be exacerbated by a severe deficiency in the recording of improvised mine 
casualties.16
A decrease in the annual total of casualties for Syria was strongly influenced by a lack of 
data on persons injured by mines/ERW (survivors). For 2016 and all years since 2012, except 
2015, data available is primarily from fatality counts registered in conflict recording systems. 
However, in 2015, for Syria the availability of data from an extensive one-time multi-country 
survey project including Syrian refuges, by Handicap International (HI),  marked the first time 
since the beginning of the conflict that a substantial dataset on persons in Syria injured by 
mines/ERW who survived was available.17
ICRC reporting had the largest number of casualties of any source for Yemen and Libya 
in 2016. These casualties are reported collectively as landmines and ERW casualties without 
the mine/ERW types differentiated.
In Yemen, 2,037 people injured by mines/ERW were admitted into 46 ICRC-supported 
hospitals, among an annual total of 33,230 weapon-wounded patients treated in 2016.18 
For 2015, the ICRC reported 812 persons injured by mines/ERW admitted to ICRC-supported 
healthcare facilities, among an annual total of 28,565 weapon-wounded patients treated.19 
The ICRC data was not disaggregated by age, gender, or device causing casualties; however, 
the ICRC has noted that the majority of casualties were male.20 Some other datasets were not 
disaggregated by calendar year. During 2016 and through April 2017, the Yemen Mine Action 
15 The casualty total for 2016 included the following types of sources, with there often being more than one 
source for some casualties in a given country: international organizations (3,505); UN and national mine 
action centers, including reporting from humanitarian mine action operators (2,475); humanitarian mine 
action operators (826); Monitor media scanning including media scanning by ICBL campaign members 
and Monitor researchers (362); other NGOs (1,323); and other UN agencies (114). For the year 2016, the 
Monitor collected casualty data from 22 different national or UN mine action centers in 21 states and 
other areas.
16 See, Landmine Monitor 2016 for details on the lack of reporting on improvised mine casualties in Iraq, 
www.the-monitor.org/LM16
17 Data on injured persons was collected by HI and partners through interviews with displaced people 
and refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015. Casualty data from 
Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis – HI, 27 May 2016. The reporting is based on 
interviews with 68,049 people assessed by HI teams, of which 25,097 were injured: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 
in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon. See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, May 2016, pp. 1–2, 
bit.ly/HISyriaMay2016; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 
June 2016, bit.ly/HISyriaJune2016.
18 ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 504, bit.ly/ICRC2016annual.
19 ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 526; and email from Rima Kamal, ICRC Yemen, 7 June 2016.








Center’s (YEMAC) office in Sanaa registered 1,020 casualties, but was unable to provide 
details for these casualties.21 The YEMAC office in Aden registered 566 casualties from March 
2015 to March 2017.22
Of the 1,610 mine/ERW casualties recorded by the Monitor for Libya in 2016, a total of 
1,465 were ICRC-reported injured mine/ERW casualties admitted to hospitals it supported 
across Libya,23 among 6,772 weapon-wounded patients treated in 2016.24 The vast majority 
of mine/ERW casualties for Libya in 2015 recorded in the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) 
database25—935 persons reported injured by ERW26—were recorded during HI surveys at two 
hospitals in Tripoli.27
Although ICRC data was not disaggregated by device type, available information from 
other reliable sources pointed to widespread landmine and improvised mine contamination 
as a threat in Libya in 2016. For example, it was reported that “ISIS [Islamic State] left 
behind a jungle of land mines,” in Sirt.28 Two consecutive UN Secretary-Generals noted “the 
widespread contamination with explosive hazards, including improvised explosive devices, 
in the areas of Sirte and Benghazi, where the risk of injury and death to civilians and to 
humanitarian actors is high,” 29 and that it “continues to threaten civilians and humanitarian 
actors in areas such as Benghazi and Tripoli.” 30
CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS31
There were at least 1,544 child casualties in 2016, the highest annual total since the 
Monitor began its recording in 1999. Child casualties in 2016 accounted for 42% of all 
civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (3,634).32 This was the similar to the 
40% recorded for 2015. Children were killed (498) or injured (1,046) by mines/ERW in 36 
countries and other areas in 2016.33
21 Interview with Mohamed Al Osta, YEMAC Sanaa, April 2017.
22 Information provided by UNDP Aden officer, in email from Aisha Saeed, Cluster Munition Monitor, 12 
April 2017. Some slightly differing casualty figures were reported for the period, accordingly: by February 
2017, 566 people injured by ERW in Aden, Abyan, and Lahj governorates and by March 2017, 632 people 
were injured by ERW since March 2015 in Aden, Abyan, Lahj, Al-Dhale, and Taizz. At least 17 wounded by 
landmines, including nine by antipersonnel mines. Email from Iskander Yousef, Danish Demining Group 
(DDG), 12 April 2017.
23 The ICRC supported four hospitals in Benghazi, Misrata, Sabha, and Tripoli.
24 ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, pp. 154 and 156, bit.ly/ICRC2016annual.
25 LibMAC data for 2015 listed an additional 340 IED casualties that were not included in Monitor records, 
including 66 emplaced IED casualties that did not indicate if the devices were command-detonated or 
victim activated.
26 Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by Abdullatif H.M. Abujarida, IMSMA Manager, LibMAC, 23 May 
2016; and Monitor media scanning for 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.
27 Those hospitals lacked reliable and updated databases, therefore casualty numbers were likely 
underreported. Hospitals made the identification of the cause of injury. Some casualties recorded as due 
to ERW may have been casualties of IEDs. Email from Anne Barthes, HI, 26 May 2016. 
28 “ISIS Fighters Are Still Lurking in Surt, Libyan Officials Warn,” New York Times, 11 August 2016, www.nytimes.
com/2016/08/12/world/middleeast/isis-fighters-are-still-lurking-in-surt-libyan-officials-warn.html.
29 UN Security Council/Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya,” S/2016/1011, 1 December 2016, para. 83.
30 UN Security Council/António Guterres, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya,” S/2017/283, 4 April 2017, para. 95.
31 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent 
that data is available and disaggregated.
32 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at the time of 
the incident.
33 In 2016, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Cambodia, Colombia, 
DRC, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, 
Palestine, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and two other areas Somaliland and Western Sahara. 
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As in previous years, in 2016 the vast 
majority of child casualties where the sex 
was known were boys (81%).34
ERW caused the most child casualties 
(669, or 43%), followed by improvised 
mines (437, or 28%). Unexploded cluster 
submunitions caused more child casualties 
(64) than antivehicle mines (61). (For 
more information on child casualties and 
assistance see the annual Monitor fact sheet 
on landmines/ERW and children.)
In 2016, men and boys made up the vast 
majority of all casualties, with 84% of all 
civilian casualties for which the sex was 
known (2,787 of 3,317). Women and girls 
made up 16% of all civilian casualties for 
which the sex was known (530).
In 2016, there were 102 casualties 
identified among deminers (25 deminers 
were killed and 77 injured) in 16 states and 
one area.35 This represented an increase 
from 2015, when 42 deminer casualties 
were recorded in 10 states. It was however, 
similar to the average of 99 casualties 
among deminers per year recorded by 
34 There were 1,055 boys and 242 girls recorded as casualties in 2016; the sex of 247 child casualties was 
not recorded.
35 In 2016, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, 






Note: This includes only the civilian casualties 
for which the age was known; among all 
casualties for which the age was known 
children made up 31% (1,549 of 4,976).
Mine/ERW casualties by age 
in 2016
Mine/ERW casualties by sex 
in 2016
Note: This includes only the casualties for 
which the sex was known.
Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/
military status in 2016
Note: This includes only the casualties for which 
the civilian/military status was known; for 3,576 
casualties the civilian status was not recorded.
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the Monitor since 1999. Between 1999 and 2016, the Monitor identified more than 1,750 
deminers who were killed or injured while undertaking clearance operations.36
Civilian casualties represented 78% of casualties in 2016 where the civilian/military 
status was known (3,921 of 5,029). 
The country with the most recorded military casualties of mines/ERW in 2016 was Ukraine, 
with 435; followed by Mali, with 82 military casualties (including peacekeeping forces); and 
Pakistan with 81 military and combatant casualties recorded (including soldiers, militia, and 
militants).
MINE/ERW TYPES RESULTING IN CASUALTIES
In 2016, landmines caused at least 3,570 casualties—including factory-made antipersonnel 
mines (732), victim-activated improvised mines (1,805), antivehicle mines (495), and 
unspecified mine types (538). 
Unexploded submunitions caused 114 casualties and other ERW 1,078 casualties. A total 
of 3,843 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were not disaggregated in data.
Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2015 and 2016
The 1,805 improvised mine casualties recorded for 2016 was the highest annual total of 
such casualties recorded since Monitor reporting began in 1999, the next highest number in 
Monitor data is 1,721 recorded for 2012. Casualties from improvised mines were identified 
in 17 states in 2016.37 Most improvised mine casualties in 2016 occurred in Afghanistan 
(1,180). 
36 There were 1,783 casualties among deminers from 1999 through 2016. Since 1999, the annual number 
of demining casualties identified has fluctuated greatly, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major 
fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data 
from a particular country in any given year, and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in 
operating procedures, international demining standards, or demining equipment.
37 Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, 






























































Historically, the number of improvised mine casualties (also recorded as victim-activated 
IED casualties) was underreported due to their being recorded as other mine/ERW categories. 
Casualties in Colombia that were recorded as antipersonnel landmine casualties have been 
reclassified in Monitor data as improvised mine casualties. It was noted in 2017 that most 
such casualties in Colombia were caused by improvised antipersonnel mines and no factory-
made antipersonnel mines casualties were known to have been recorded in the national 
casualty database. Among casualties recorded as caused by antipersonnel landmines in 
Myanmar, it is also extremely likely that there are casualties of improvised antipersonnel 
mines. 
A difference in terminology between Cameroon and Nigeria was apparent, despite the 
same non-state armed group using improvised mines in both. Media reporting for Cameroon 
consistently used “mine,” while for Nigeria both “landmines” and “IEDs” were reported as 
causing casualties. In India, media reporting specified that improvised mines were activated 
by the presence of a person or vehicle, including pressure-plate activated devices, accounting 
for the significant increase in casualties from seven in 2015 to 79 in 2016.38
Casualties recorded as caused by antipersonnel mines increased from 602 in 2015 to 732 
in 2016, with casualties recorded in 23 states and areas.39
In 2016, antivehicle mines caused at least 495 casualties in 19 states and other areas.40 
The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were 
Ukraine (127) and Yemen (103). In 2015, antivehicle mines caused 459 casualties.41
Casualties recorded as being due to unspecified mine types decreased to 538 in 2016 from 
941 in 2015. This was mostly attributable to there being a far greater number of casualties 
recorded as caused by unknown mine/ERW items in 2016, which would encompass various 
mine types.42
38 Data on improvised mine (victim-activated IED casualties) included data from among the 445 casualties 
of explosive incidents categorized as “victim-activated” in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive 
violence data set for 2016. AOAV casualty data for 2016 provided by email from Jennifer Dathan, Researcher, 
AOAV, 15 September 2017; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project 
(ACLED), “ACLED Version 7 All Africa 1997–2016,” and “ACLED Asia Running File 2016,” data for calendar 
year 2016. Approved citation: Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. 
Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Journal of Peace Research 47(5) 651-660.
39 In 2016, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chile, 
Croatia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Thailand, Ukraine, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and Somaliland.
40 In 2016, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.
41 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-
vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 423 casualties from both confirmed and suspected 
antivehicle mines in 22 countries in 2016. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign 
Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 24 August 2017. See also, GICHD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mines,” undated, 
www.gichd.org/mine-action-topics/human-security/anti-vehicle-mines-avm-.WfYW3Ygo9PY. Monitor and 
GICHD-SIPRI methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in the differences in annual casualties 
reported. For example, Monitor data does not include casualties that occur to persons engaged in laying 
or emplacing mines. Monitor reporting does include politically disputed geographic “other areas” in 
reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible. In some 
cases, when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle mines and improvised mines in different 
sources, the Monitor included those as improvised mine casualties.
42 In 2016, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 









In 2016, 1,078 casualties were caused by ERW in 39 states and areas,43 with 1,932 ERW 
casualties recorded for 2015. Children (669) made up 66% of civilian ERW casualties in 2016, 
when the age group was recorded.44
In 2016, the number of casualties of unknown mine/ERW items in the Monitor global 
total jumped to 3,843, compared to 1,410 in 2015 and just 279 in 2014. For 2016, about 
half (1,943, or 51%) of all casualties of unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in Yemen, 
and another 39% were recorded in Libya (1,493). The overwhelming majority of casualties 
of such unknown items were injured persons (3,648), with most documented and reported 
in health facility records under a general default category of landmines and ERW.45 The 
remaining 407 casualties of unknown mine/ERW items occurred in 15 countries in 2016.46
States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2016
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Americas



































































Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in bold; other areas in italics.
43 In 2016, Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Guinea-
Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, and other areas Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of 
ERW in 2016, 114 casualties of unexploded submunitions were identified in BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, 
Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen. For more information on casualties caused by 
unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2016, see 
ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/cluster-munition-
monitor-2017/casualties.aspx.
44 Of the total ERW casualties in 2016, 350 were civilian adults.
45 They made up the vast majority of the casualties recorded for Yemen and Libya in 2016. In addition, 189 
casualties of unknown mine/ERW items were killed, and for six the survival outcome was not known.
46 Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in 17 countries: Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Iran, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Yemen, and 
Zimbabwe.
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Antipersonnel mines Munitions designed to exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person, 
and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban 
Treaty
Antivehicle mines Also referred to as “antitank mines,” 
and included among mines other than 
antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM), are designed 
to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a 
person and tend to contain a larger explosive 
charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle 
mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban 
Treaty unless they are fitted with fuses that 
can be detonated by the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person 
Improvised mines Improvised mines are types of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), which are 
“homemade” explosive weapons that are 
designed to cause death or injury. Improvised 
mines are victim-activated IEDs that are 
detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person or a vehicle. These are 
landmines and are sometimes referred to as 
artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-
IEDs), or by the type of construction, such 
as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). In Monitor 
casualty reporting, the terms “victim-activated 
improvised mine” or “improvised mines” are 








casualties under the 
category “improvised 
mines”**
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including 
booby traps that can be detonated by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person, 
fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines 
and are therefore prohibited under the Mine 
Ban Treaty. A booby trap is an antipersonnel 
explosive device deliberately placed to cause 
casualties when an apparently harmless 




When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” 
incident, but the information to distinguish if 
it was an antipersonnel or an antivehicle mine 







Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or 
released by, or otherwise separated from, a 
cluster munition and failed to explode or that 











(Other) ERW Unexploded ordnance 
(UXO)
Explosive weapons that have been primed, 
fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use 
or used. It may have been fired, dropped, 




Explosive weapons (not included in categories 
above) that have not been used during an 





explosive items, type 
unknown 
Unknown mine/ERW are explosive items 
causing casualties that were detonated by 
the presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
or a vehicle that were not attributed to a 
specific mine/ERW type either because it was 
not known what type of mine or ERW caused 
the casualty when information was recorded, 
or due to a lack of disaggregation between 
victim-activated explosives and ERW causing 
casualties within a dataset, including when 
mine/ERW casualties are differentiated as such 
from other weapon victims
Note: * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of victim-activated antipersonnel IEDs are 
prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed 
under, on or near the ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed 
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.
** In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised 
mines because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the sensitivity of fuzes after 
an explosion. The information that is available indicates that the fuzing of most victim-activated 
IEDs causing casualties allows them to be activated by a person (as well as a vehicle), and therefore 
banned by the treaty. As a shorthand, the Monitor at times simply uses the term “improvised mine” to 
encompass any improvised victim-activated IED because they are likely to function as antipersonnel 





























































Margaret Arach Orech asks about prostheses at the Gulu Regional Orthopaedic workshop, 
Uganda.















The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament convention committing States Parties 
to provide assistance to the victims of a specific weapon. Twenty years on, what had started 
as a single paragraph in a treaty section on international cooperation has become much 
more.
At the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in 1997, Jody Williams, the co-laureate with the ICBL, 
announced the intention of the campaign to intensify its efforts to fortify the original, 
somewhat truncated, victim assistance provision:
…we would like stronger language regarding victim assistance. But, given the 
close cooperation with governments which resulted in the treaty itself, we are 
certain that these issues can be addressed through the annual meetings and 
review conferences provided for in the treaty.1
Unquestionably, based on the evidence of many years of Monitor reporting, that is 
what has happened. Fifteen annual Meetings of States Parties, many more intersessional 
meetings, regional symposia, national seminars, and three five-year review conferences have 
advanced and extended the development of victim assistance. Mutually-agreed objectives 
further manifested States Parties’ commitments, through the universally-adopted five-year 
action plans. 
Since the emergence of victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-
related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance 
into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention 
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) in 2008, and 
most recently included in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
A striking collection of objectives, action points, research findings, guidance, and 
recommendations of outcome documents, reports, and other publications has supported 
1 “Jody Williams—Nobel Lecture,” Oslo, 10 December 1997, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/1997/williams-lecture.html.
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the practical implementation of activities. National government focal points were 
appointed, and training programs implemented to build their capacity. Above all, the work 
was driven by the persistent efforts of states and civil society. International, national, 
and local organizations worked together, including representatives of the survivors’ own 
networks.
The components of victim assistance include, but are not restricted to: data collection 
and needs assessment with referral to emergency and continuing medical care; physical 
rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; 
social and economic inclusion; and the adoption or adjustment of relevant laws and 
public policies. Mine victims according to the accepted understanding of the term, includes 
survivors2 as well as affected families and communities.3
The Monitor website includes detailed country profiles examining progress in victim 
assistance in some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4
A collection of thematic overviews, briefing papers, factsheets, and infographics related to 
victim assistance produced since 1999, as well as the latest key country profiles, is available 
through the Victim Assistance Resources portal on the Monitor website.5
At the halfway point of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Maputo Action Plan 2014–2019, this 
chapter principally takes stock of the annual changes and challenges to assistance in the 
States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs. It draws from reporting 
on the activities and challenges of hundreds of relevant programs implemented through 
government agencies, international and national organizations and NGOs, survivors’ networks 
and similar community-based organizations, as well as other service providers.
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2 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
3 See, “Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.icbl.org/media/933290/Nairobi-Action-Plan-2005.pdf.
4 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Findings specific to victim 
assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine 
Monitor 2017’s companion publication; ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017, bit.ly/CMM17.
5 See, the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/victim-
assistance.aspx.
6 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties 
in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for 












At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference held in Maputo in 2014, States Parties 
formally declared that they remain very much aware of their “enduring obligations to mine 
victims.”7 The actions of the Maputo Action Plan also adopted at that conference, can be 
summarized as follows:
  Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; support efforts to 
make referrals to existing services.
  Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
  Ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their 
representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance capacity.
  Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social 
protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
  Address the needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
  Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives annually.
  Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.
The plan also affirms the need for States Parties to continue carrying out the actions 
of the previous Cartagena Action Plan in order to make assistance available, affordable, 
accessible, and sustainable.8
ASSESSING THE NEEDS
States Parties commit to assess needs for victim assistance—including through sex- and age-
disaggregated data—and gauge the availability of services required.9 They should also use 
this assessment activity as an opportunity to make referrals to existing services. Most states 
did not report large-scale needs assessments for 2016–2017, although many collected data 
disaggregated by age and gender through casualty recording systems.
A project to support the demining sector in Chad started a victim identification and 
needs assessment survey in two pilot regions in September 2016, to be completed in 2018. 
In Cambodia, the Quality of Life Survey continued reaching survivors and persons with 
disabilities in mine-affected and areas of the country. In Albania, a socio-economic and 
medical needs assessment of marginalized ERW victims was conducted in three phases from 
2013 through 2016, which included referrals and useful information for further planning. 
The victim assistance department of Yemen’s mine action program screened more than 
4,000 survivors in 2016, more than 10% of whom received some direct support.
In most countries where NGO services providers operated, they made efforts to understand 
the needs of beneficiaries or affected populations as well as the barriers that they face in 
accessing services. However, this information was not always shared widely and, in some 
cases, due to a lack of capacity to store or process the information in the relevant ministries’ 
departments, did not reach national mechanisms. Mine action operators that collected 
information on casualties sometimes also provided referrals or direct support to survivors.
FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSISTANCE
The Maputo Action Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims and also 
emphasizes the need to simultaneously integrate victim assistance into other frameworks 
including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty 
reduction.10 It also recognizes that in addition to integrating victim assistance, States Parties 
need to, in actual fact, “ensure that broader frameworks are reaching mine victims.”
7 “MAPUTO +15,” Declaration of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, adopted 27 June 2014, www.
apminebanconvention.org/eu-council-decision/maputo-15.
8 “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 
December 2009, bit.ly/MBTCartagenaPlan.
9 Maputo Action Plan Action #12, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.
10 Maputo Action Plan Actions #12 to #18.
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Many of these frameworks have their own representative international administrations, 
guidance documents, plans, and objectives that may also be reflected in national-level 
activities that can reach survivors, families, and communities. (For more information about 
national legal frameworks and new laws, see the section at the end of this chapter.)
The following frameworks are among those that have particular relevance to the 
implementation of victim assistance actions: 
United Nations coordinated approach to victim assistance
Within the UN system, an expanded UN Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action adopted 
in 2016 “intends to generate a renewed impetus and commitment from the United Nations 
in support of mine and ERW victims.”11
World Health Organization plans and guidance
The World Health Organization (WHO) Global Disability Action Plan 2014–2021 was 
developed and revised with broad input, including a joint contribution by ICBL members 
and participating survivor networks. The plan reflects many of the most important concerns 
raised by survivor networks, such as ensuring access to rehabilitation in rural and remote 
areas, as well as participation and inclusion. 
In 2017, the WHO recommendations on health-related 
rehabilitation were released. They comprise a 2030 perspective 
linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The WHO 
also has a comprehensive mental health action plan 2013–
2020. In addition, although less recently, the WHO community-
based rehabilitation (CBR) guidelines were promoted among 
victim assistance actors from States Parties.12
Humanitarian disarmament settings
In November 2016, on the margins of the Mine Ban Treaty 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, the Coordinators on Victim 
Assistance, and the Coordinators on Cooperation and Assistance 
of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, together with the Mine 
Ban Treaty Victim Assistance Committee, launched guidance 
publications. These were, respectively: the “Guidance on an 
Integrated Approach to Victim Assistance: by States for States,” 
undertaken with technical support from Handicap International;13 
and the “Guidance on Victim Assistance Reporting,” developed 
with a technical expert on victim assistance, that applies to 
commitments made by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons Protocol V.14
Also, at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, the delegation 
of Italy proposed to have the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
coordinators’ guidance on an “Integrated Approach to Victim 
Assistance” mentioned in the meeting’s final report document. 
11 “The United Nations Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action (2016 Update),” undated, bit.ly/
UNMineActionVA2016; and UNMAS, “Issues: Victim Assistance,” undated, www.mineaction.org/issues/
victimassistance.
12 The WHO CBR Guidelines were the subject of focused training for government victim assistance focal points 
at the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2010; a victim assistance experts’ program was 
dedicated to their Geneva launch and training on their practical application, bit.ly/MBT10MSPVA.
13 “Guidance on an Integrated Approach to Victim Assistance: By States for States,” 30 November 2016, www.
clusterconvention.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/here.pdf.
14 “Guidance on Victim Assistance Reporting,” undated but 2016, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/Guidance-on-Victim-Assistance-Reporting.pdf. 
Guidance publications launched at the 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties to the 
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Some debate over the appropriateness of the reference to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions followed. Subsequently, the final report included a mention of the ultimately 
synergistic goals of the collaboration between the treaty-machinery victim assistance 
coordination bodies:15
The Meeting also took note of the conclusions of the Committee on Victim 
Assistance, with particular reference to encouraging the exchange of information 
and experiences, where applicable, regarding how victim assistance is dealt with 
under different conventions.16
Sustainable Development Goals
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are highly complementary to the aims of victim 
assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty, and they offer opportunities for bridging between 
relevant frameworks. The SDGs, a set of 17 aspirational goals with corresponding targets and 
indicators that all UN member states are expected to use to frame policies and stimulate 
action for positive change in 2015–2030, are designed to address the economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Their emphasis is on reaching the 
most marginalized persons, commonly phrased as “leaving no-one behind.”17
Transitional justice mechanisms and reparations funds
In many post-conflict countries, national mechanisms to compensate or assist victims of 
armed conflict are a major source of support that can benefit survivors and their families 
and communities. Governments have established transitional justice mechanisms to 
provide compensation and benefits. The Monitor has identified states with war reparations 
mechanisms or similar legislation that are reported to provide assistance by various means 
to mine/ERW victims among other conflict victims. These include Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, 
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Turkey. Chile is 
a new addition to this list as in 2017, after a years-long process, it adopted legislation to 
provide reparations for mine/ERW survivors.
Similarly, specific international funding for conflict victims can also benefit mine/ERW 
survivors and other victims. For example, in northern Uganda the International Criminal 
Court’s Trust Fund for Victims (VTF) supports health and rehabilitation activities for conflict 
victims, including mine/ERW survivors. In Afghanistan, the Third Afghan Civilian Assistance 
Program (ACAP III) provides targeted immediate assistance to victims of conflict—including 
mines/ERW—, strengthens existing services, and contributes to the development of national 
authorities’ capabilities to provide assistance to civilian victims of conflict.
Rights of persons with disabilities
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the international human 
rights legal instrument that has been most discussed in relation to the implementation of 
victim assistance. Victim assistance is often included in international and national CRPD 
coordination structures of countries that are party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the 
CRPD. State reporting under the CRPD has sometimes also mentioned victim assistance 
15 Australia, the Netherlands, and Belgium supported the inclusion of the text proposed by Italy, while Chile 
welcomed the guidance and encouraged further work between the coordinators with the objective to 
support victim assistance as one of the most important aims of both conventions. Brazil, Greece, and 
Turkey took the floor to speak against the proposal. 
16 “Final Report, Fifteenth Meeting Santiago, 28 November–1 December 2016,” APLC/MSP.15/2016/10, 14 
December 2016, para. 29, bit.ly/MBTMSP15Final.
17 Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in the SDGs: education (Goal 4), employment (Goal 8), 
reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including 
persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (Goal 17). With an emphasis on poverty 
reduction, equality, and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace 
and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.”
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and landmine survivors.18 Only five States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant 
numbers of survivors are not party to the CRPD: Chad is a signatory, while Eritrea, Somalia, 
South Sudan, and Tajikistan have not signed the CRPD.
In progressive orientation toward disability rights-based assistance by international 
actors, in early 2017, the ICRC’s Special Fund for the Disabled (created in 1983) became 
the MoveAbility Foundation. With increased international attention on issues of disability 
attributable to the CRPD, the change reflects the international organization’s broader 
adjusted operational orientation since 2014, which is specifically inclusive of the needs of 
all persons with disabilities.19
Conflict and humanitarian emergencies
In 2016–2017, activities continued to raise awareness of, or improve, responses to the needs 
and rights of persons with disabilities in armed conflicts and fragile situations that could 
potentially benefit mine survivors and their communities.
The charter on the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian Action was 
adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016.20 An Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian 
Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt implementation guidelines by the 
end of 2018. Co-chairs are from UNICEF, the International Disability Alliance, and Handicap 
International. They lead a large task team consisting of 48 individuals from 35 various 
organizations, including many that are involved in victim assistance or contribute to the 
wellbeing and rights of survivors.21
Two States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and ongoing conflict, Iraq 
and Yemen, had a Level-3 IASC system-wide response activated in 2016–2017. Such an 
activation occurs when a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes and 
it is clear that the existing capacity to coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and 
protection does not match the scale, complexity, and urgency of the crisis.22
Other States Parties where conflict and unstable security situations impacted implemen-
tation of victim assistance included Afghanistan, DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, and Turkey.
Regional mechanisms for the rights of persons with disabilities
The Maputo Action Plan highlights regional opportunities for the fulfillment of relevant 
actions. Also, it affirms that each state will take into account “its own local, national and 
regional circumstances.”23 Regional mechanisms for the rights of persons with disabilities 
are among the relevant instruments providing such opportunities, but to date few States 
Parties have made the connection in their reporting on victim assistance. These mechanisms 
include the following:24
  Continental Plan of Action for the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities 2010–
2019.
18 The 26 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of survivors that are also States 
Parties to the CRPD are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, 
DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, 
Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
19 ICRC, “Special Appeal 2016: Disability and Mine Action,” Geneva, December 2015, www.icrc.org/sites/
default/files/topic/file_plus_list/disability_mine2016_rex2015_651_final.pdf.
20 “Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action,” undated but 2016, http://
humanitariandisabilitycharter.org/.
21 IASC, “2017 Progress Report–IASC Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian 
Action,” 10 March 2017, bit.ly/IASCProgress17.
22 Based on an analysis of five criteria: scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. IASC, “L3 
IASC System-wide response activations and deactivations,” 4 April, 2017, bit.ly/IASCL3.
23 Maputo Action Plan Action #15.












  Asian and Pacific Decade of Persons with Disabilities for the period 2013 to 2022 
and its implementing framework with indicators, the Incheon Strategy to “Make the 
Right Real” for Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific.
  Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Persons with Disabilities.
  Council of Europe Strategy on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities—Human Rights: 
A Reality for All 2017–2023.
ENHANCING PLANS AND POLICIES
At the national level and within the community of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action 
Plan provides a framework that allows States Parties to make qualitative assessments of 
progress in victim assistance. It calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims, 
while integrating victim assistance into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions 
into the appropriate sectors. These include disability, health, social welfare, education, 
employment, development, and poverty reduction.25 States Parties commit to addressing 
victim assistance objectives “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the 
Convention.”26
States Parties committed to have time-bound and measurable objectives to implement 
national policies and plans that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim 
assistance.27 In 2016, 13 of the 31 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability 
plans in place, and another two had draft plans.28 In 2016–2017, broad disability plans with 
relevance to mine/ERW survivors were adopted in Albania and BiH.
In 2016, 20 of the 31 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms 
or disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs 
of mine/ERW survivors.29 Coordination of victim assistance in BiH restarted and a new 
coordination mechanism was adopted through the national mine action center in Turkey. 
Among the States Parties with active victim assistance coordination in 2016, most active 
national coordination mechanisms either collaborated with,30 or were included as part of,31 
a disability coordination mechanism. 
INCLUSION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF MINE VICTIMS
States Parties should ensure the “full and active participation of mine victims and their 
representative organizations in all matters that affect them.”32 In 2016, survivors and 
their representative organizations, including survivor networks and disabled persons’ 
organizations, participated in coordination activities in at least 17 of the 20 States Parties 
with active mechanisms.33 In Colombia, after years of advocacy, landmine survivors won the 
right to join in Victim’s Participation Roundtables (VPRs) as a specific category of victims, 
thus ensuring them a spot at each table at all community levels.
25 Maputo Action Plan Actions #12 to #18.
26 “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3. 
27 Maputo Action Plan Action #13.
28 Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Tajikistan, 
and Thailand. Algeria and Sudan had plans pending approval or formal adoption.
29 The states with coordination mechanisms were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH (restarted), Burundi, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey (new).
30 In Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, 
Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
31 In Cambodia, Iraq, South Sudan, and Tajikistan.
32 Maputo Action Plan Action #16. 
33 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, 













AVAILABILITY OF AND ACCESSIBILITY TO 
SERVICES 
States Parties committed to “increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate 
comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion opportunities and social 
protection measures…including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and 
paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”34 The following changes, progress, and 
challenges were reported for 2016 in the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of 
survivors and needs:
Medical care
Medical care services for mine/ERW survivors were strengthened in some countries in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region, including in Burundi, Chad, and Mozambique. However, access 
to medical care remained limited in the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, with 
survivors having to travel long distances in order to access services, or being unable to access 
primary healthcare services at all. In Somalia, ongoing conflict damaged health facilities and 
continued to weaken an already fragile health system. In Sudan and South Sudan, emergency 
healthcare services were mainly provided by international organizations and NGOs.
In Afghanistan, where ongoing conflict resulted in continued high-demand for medical 
care, there were fewer resources available for mine/ERW survivors in 2016 compared with 
2015.
In Croatia, cooperation between a pharmacy and a national foundation resulted in the 
donation of products for treating the health problems of people affected by mines/ERW.
Some healthcare services for persons with disabilities were available in Iraq, but have 
decreased over time. International organizations continued to provide much needed 
assistance in conflict affected areas. In Yemen, health facilities were damaged and the 
ongoing conflict further weakened the health system.
Rehabilitation including prosthetics 
Sustained efforts to improve the availability of physical rehabilitation services were reported 
in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Sudan. Shortage of raw materials and 
financial resources were an obstacle to the development of the physical rehabilitation sector 
in Angola, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Moreover, such services were often only available in major 
cities. Survivors in Angola, Chad, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal, and 
Zimbabwe struggled to access physical rehabilitation and orthopedic services because the 
number of facilities providing these services were limited, and sometimes costly. Ongoing 
conflict and insecurity also hindered access to rehabilitation services in the DRC and Somalia. 
In Afghanistan, three new physical rehabilitation centers were established in as many 
provinces, however at least seven more such centers were still planned and needed. 
Authorities also acknowledged that it would be unrealistic to consider the government 
capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services itself. Due to a severe funding 
problem, physical rehabilitation was significantly reduced at centers run by an NGO in two 
provinces. In Cambodia, a national NGO was forced to stop providing services including 
wheelchairs and assistive devices due a lack of funding and donor constraints from July 
2015 through May 2016, and production was severely reduced throughout 2016. A draft 
curriculum for a physiotherapy school was developed. No significant progress in aligning 
rehabilitation reporting systems or handover of centers to government management was 
reported, but such plans were developed and adjusted.
In Albania, the quality of services provided at the National Prosthetic Center remained 
inadequate, creating greater demand at the rehabilitation center in the area where most 
34 Maputo Action Plan Action #15.
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survivors live. In BiH and Serbia, while provision of orthopedic devices is mandated by law, 
associated regulations were not adequately enforced thus limiting access. In Croatia, few 
changes were identified in the availability of or access to services and programs by mine/
ERW survivors. In Tajikistan, the renovation of the branch of the national prosthetics center 
in a mine-affected region was completed.
The coverage of physiotherapy care was extended through home visits in El Salvador, 
while in Nicaragua the health ministry hired additional technicians for the national 
rehabilitation center and satellite centers. A critical situation for prostheses supply in 
Colombia was reported, with access through the state health system taking between one 
year and one-and-a-half years, while in rural areas inadequate availability and quality of 
prosthesis sometimes resulted in health complications for survivors.
In Algeria, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities continued to have 
access to most prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. Iraq increased the capacity-
building of physiotherapists, but fewer prostheses were provided to mine/ERW survivors in 
2016 than in 2015. In Yemen, material support to physical rehabilitation centers increased to 
respond to higher demand. The availability of rehabilitation increased in Jordan.
Socio-economic inclusion
Projects to encourage the economic inclusion of survivors were rare and under-resourced 
in Angola, Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. In 2016, socio-economic 
inclusion activities decreased sharply in Senegal and South Sudan, and were nearly 
nonexistent in Somalia. In Zimbabwe, only 15% of the population was engaged in formal 
employment, which drastically limited opportunities for persons with disabilities. Some 
economic and social inclusion programs were reported in Burundi, Chad, DRC, Guinea-
Bissau, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Sudan, and Sudan. In Burundi, the program included a range 
of levers, such as occupational training, microloans, membership of a community mutual 
support group, and business start-up kits. In Guinea-Bissau, there was an emphasis on social 
inclusion through sports. Vocational training programs were implemented in Ethiopia, 
Senegal, South Sudan, and Sudan.
In Albania, some NGO-led economic and social inclusion programs were reported, 
however governmental social services agencies were often unable to implement them due 
to a lack of funding. The number of available economic inclusion activities and beneficiaries 
declined rapidly in BiH.
In Iraq, there was a lack of statistics on access by persons with disabilities to work 
opportunities, but the Ministry of Labor provided some flexible low-interest loans for 
conflict survivors. Socio-economic inclusion activities were nearly nonexistent in Yemen, 
where livelihood activities by the survivor network stopped due to lack of funding.
Education
In 2016–2017, inclusive education programs were being implemented in Algeria, Burundi, 
Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. However, despite ongoing efforts, the Ministry 
of Education of DRC estimated that it was educating too few children with disabilities. The 
education systems in Eritrea and Mozambique were not inclusive, with separate schools 
for children with disabilities, while school buildings in Mozambique were inaccessible to 
persons with disabilities. In Guinea-Bissau, civil society noted that persons with disabilities 
experienced neglect in their community and throughout the education system.
Psychosocial support 
The provision of psychosocial services increased in 2016 in DRC and Eritrea. In Eritrea 
in particular, these services were deployed to four regions that had previously not been 
reached. Psychological support however remained one of the biggest challenges in mine/
ERW victim assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such services were extremely limited, or non-












Zimbabwe. There was a decrease in the availability of psychosocial services in Mozambique 
and Senegal.
Afghanistan and Cambodia required planning and structures to make available 
psychosocial support, including making peer support more available and sustainable.
In Colombia, peer support would have to be recognized formally in the universal health 
coverage system in order for survivors’ organizations to access resources for implementation 
through universal coverage, as they do with other victim assistance-related services.
Psychological support remained among the most serious needs of survivors in Albania. 
One survivors’ organization in BiH continued to integrate peer support provided by survivors 
themselves into government-run services. No significant changes were reported for Croatia, 
where it was previously found that social, psychological, and peer support remained 
neglected areas of rehabilitation.
The availability of psychological support and follow-up trauma care in Iraq, including for 
internally displaced persons, was inadequate to meet needs. In Yemen, international NGOs 
increased mental health and psychosocial support activities across the country in response 
to massive trauma and the increasing need for services.
GUARANTEEING RIGHTS IN AN AGE- AND GENDER-
SENSITIVE MANNER
The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the 
rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”35 
Gender considerations
While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be 
disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple 
forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance 
for women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).36 Implementation of 
CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of women and girls and 
protect them from discrimination and exploitation.37
In Ethiopia, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities expressed concern 
at the lack of inclusive education opportunities, especially for girls with disabilities. The 
number of projects for children with disabilities in Senegal decreased due to the unreasonable 
length and difficulty of administrative processes under the Committee for the Protection of 
the Child that now channeled funding from UNICEF. In DRC, a project was implemented that 
promoted the socio-economic inclusion of persons with disabilities—in particular women 
and girls.
Support was given to the training of health professionals in Colombia in order to raise 
awareness about addressing gender- and age-related needs of survivors. Increases in the 
limits for the granting of loans to women beneficiaries in El Salvador aimed at providing the 
opportunity for greater gender-sensitive development.
Afghanistan’s mine action gender mainstreaming strategy 2014–2016 upon expiry was 
replaced with a new mine action gender and diversity policy.
In Croatia, a project included unemployed women from mine-affected communities 
35 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.
36 Of the 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to 
CEDAW.
37 The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and 
post-conflict situations, and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human 
rights are also particularly applicable.
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who were among the most marginalized, including social welfare beneficiaries living in 
underprivileged areas, members of ethnic minorities, women with disabilities, and survivors 
of domestic violence.
In Yemen, women faced additional challenges accessing medical care due to the lack of 
gender-sensitive services, including a lack of female rehabilitation professionals.
Age considerations
Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. In 2016 and 
2017, inclusive education and age-sensitive assistance were far from adequate in most 
countries. In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly 
relevant to the implementation of victim assistance with a 
rights-based approach.38
The annually updated Monitor factsheet on the Impact 
of Mines/ERW on Children contains more details on issues 
pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.39
COMMUNICATING OBJECTIVES AND 
REPORTING IMPROVEMENTS
Victim assistance objectives should be updated, their 
implementation monitored, and progress reported annually. 
Each year, “plans, policies, legal frameworks” should be adapted 
and improved according to the States Parties’ evidence-based 
objectives. Budgets should also be reported.40
As in the previous year, more than half of the most-affected 
31 States Parties included some information on victim 
assistance activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports 
covering calendar year 2016.41 Eleven States Parties reported 
on progress and on victim assistance activities conducted 
during the previous year.42 Less than half of the most-affected 
31 States Parties included in their victim assistance reporting 
existing, or newly adopted, national policies, plans, and legal 
frameworks.43 When reporting on national policies, plans, 
and legal frameworks, about a third of those States Parties 
reported on victim assistance plans, a third on disability policy, 
38 Some of the resources on children and victim assistance include: Sebastian Kasack, Assistance to Victims of 
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War: Guidance on Child-focused Victim Assistance (UNICEF, November 
2014), www.mineaction.org/resources/guidance-child-focused-victim-assistance-unicef; Austria and 
Colombia, “Strengthening the Assistance to Child Victims,” Maputo Review Conference Documents, June 
2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Austria-Colombia-Paper.pdf; and 
Republic of Colombia, “Guide for Comprehensive assistance to boys, girls and adolescent landmine victims 
– Guidelines for the constructions of plans, programmes, projects and protocols,” Bogota, 2014, bit.ly/
ColombiaLandmineVA2014.
39 These factsheets, produced since 2009, can be accessed at the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” 
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/victim-assistance.aspx. 
40 Maputo Action Plan Actions #13 and #14.
41 The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, 
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Algeria submitted identical reporting to the previous year and Burundi 
reported on information from 2012.
42 Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen reported 
directly on victim assistance activities and progress.
43 The States Parties that mentioned national policies, plans and legal frameworks in their Article 7 report 
were: Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Jordan, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, and Zimbabwe.
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and the remaining third on both. Inclusive education was noted in some reporting, but 
assistance under other frameworks was not cited.
There is no detailed or specific format for reporting on victim assistance under the Mine 
Ban Treaty, however suggestions and guidelines have been presented over time.44 The “Guide 
to Reporting”45 submitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting 
of States Parties indicates that victim assistance activities, policies, and plans could be 
reported on a sequential form marked, G.46 Yet, the majority of the 31 most-affected States 
Parties used other forms, the voluntary form J,47 as well as F(1) and H(2) to report on victim 
assistance.
Although States Parties made a political commitment to communicate time-bound and 
measurable objectives, such objectives were almost always absent from Article 7 reports. 
Only Thailand reported directly on measurable national objectives. Afghanistan, Albania, 
Cambodia, and Croatia also reported some measurable activities that aligned with objectives. 
Most states that reported focused on implementation and monitoring of services rather than 
enhancements to plans and frameworks as called for in the Maputo Action Plan.
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND NEW LAWS
According to the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties collectively agree that victim assistance 
should be integrated into broader national policies, plans, and legal frameworks and that they 
will make “enhancements” to the legal frameworks in effect as a means of operationalizing 
the integration. Some new plans and policies were adopted in the reporting period, and 
several more had been drafted and were pending endorsement.
As the CRPD is implemented in Ethiopia, many new policies and guidelines have been 
issued to localize the provisions of the convention that also benefit mine/ERW survivors. 
South Sudan launched the National Disability and Inclusion Policy in 2016, which was yet 
to have funding allocated. The Sudan Persons with Disabilities Act 2017 was adopted and 
signed.
El Salvador incorporated new policies for granting credits with a gender focus and 
consideration of the extent of vulnerability of beneficiaries.
The process of amending discriminatory national disability legislation in Afghanistan was 
completed. 
In Croatia, the ministry responsible for war veterans announced a new law on civilian war 
victims, including mine/ERW survivors. Tajikistan, which is not party to the CRPD, approved 
a National Program on Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, covering physical 
rehabilitation services and social inclusion and protection.
Often the process for adopting legislation remained under review pending formal 
adoption for extensive time periods. In some cases, the pace of policy development was 
so sluggish that the strategic approaches being articulated became outdated or irrelevant 
before they were adopted.
The results of a 2010 survey in Angola that was intended to inform victim assistance 
policy were yet to be translated into programming by 2016. The application decree for the 
44 See, ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance (Prepared for the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, 
Socio-economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness), “Draft Suggestion for Use of Form J to Report on 
Victim Assistance,” December 2000, bit.ly/FormJSuggestions2000; and see the more recent Mine Ban 
Treaty, “Guide To Reporting,” October 2015, bit.ly/2MBTReportingGuide2015.
45 Mine Ban Treaty, “Guide to Reporting,” October 2015, bit.ly/2MBTReportingGuide2015.
46 Of the 31 most-affected States Parties, only Cambodia, Colombia, Thailand, and Yemen used form G to 
report on victim assistance activities.
47 Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Burundi, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Peru, and South Sudan. Mine Ban Treaty States 
Parties have been previously encouraged to use Form J of the Article 7 reporting format “in particular to 
report on assistance provided for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of 
mine victims.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, Reporting Format.
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domestic law protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in Chad remained pending 
the president’s signature to make it a law. A proposal for a new disability rights law in DRC 
was drafted in 2012, but the draft had not been approved by the end of 2016. In 2011, 
Eritrea announced the development of a national disability policy, which remains in draft 
status. In 2015, Somalia announced that the prime minister had “ratified” the CRPD, however, 
it had not been deposited as of October 2017. Zimbabwe has ratified the CRPD, but is yet to 
domesticate the law or revise existing legislation accordingly.
In Nicaragua, veterans protested that the 2013 law that regulates assistance for basic 
necessities and socio-economic reintegration to former combatants including those with 
disabilities, was not implemented.
A national disability and physical rehabilitation strategic plan for the health sector for 
2016–2020 in Afghanistan was drafted and in approval stages. 
Regulations concerning the rights of persons with disabilities in BiH lack the legal 
mechanisms necessary for their actual implementation and enforcement. In Serbia, a strategy 
for improvement of the situation of persons with disability by 2024 had been drafted and 
was awaiting the view of the European Commission as of March 2017.
A review in 2016 recommended Iraq’s law on the care of persons with disabilities and 




























































The Second International Pledging Conference for the Implementation of the Convention 
was held on 28 February 2017 in Geneva.














SUPPORT FOR  
MINE ACTION
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the 
right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order 
to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action 
provided for calendar year 2016 by affected countries and international donors. Cooperation 
and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance 
can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of 
experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing. 
2016 FIGURES AND TRENDS
  Thirty-two donors and 11 affected states reported contributing US$564.5 million 
in international and national support for mine action in 20161; this is $39.3 million 
more than the revised 2015 amount (a 7% increase). 
  International contributions accounted for 85% of overall support for mine action 
in 2016, while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs 
accounted for the remaining 15% of global funding. 
  Donors contributed $479.5 million in international support for mine action to 40 
affected states and three other areas. This represents an increase of $85.5 million 
from 2015 (a 22% increase). 
  National contributions: The Monitor identified 11 affected states that provided $85 
million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, $46.2 million 
less than in 2015 (a 35% decrease), when 14 affected countries reported contributing 
$131.2 million.
  Contributions from the top five donors—the United States (US), the European 
Union (EU), Japan, Germany, and Norway—amounted to more than $335 million and 
accounted for 70% of all international funding.
1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for 
calendar year 2016, as of November 2017. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in 
current dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, 
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions 
is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year. The total amount 
of international support for 2015 was revised to include contributions from Canada, the United States 
(US), and the European Union (EU) that were not previously reported by the Monitor.
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  The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Croatia, Cambodia, and Lao 
PDR—received a combined total of nearly $259 million, representing 54% of all 
international contributions.
  International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and 
risk education (72% of all funding), victim assistance (4%), capacity-building (2.5%), 
and advocacy (0.5%). The remaining 21% was not disaggregated by the donors.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2016
In 2016, 32 donors contributed $479.5 million in international support for mine action in 40 
affected states and three other areas, an increase of $85.5 million (22%) from the revised 
$394 million reported in 2015.2
After three years of declining support (a 26% decrease was recorded between 2012 and 
2015), total international support provided in 2016 represents the third-highest level of the 
past decade—after the $498.9 million provided in 2012, and the $480.4 in 2010.
International support for mine action: 2006–2016
PLEDGES IN 2016 AND 2017
At the Maputo Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties committed to complete 
their respective time-bound obligations by 2025. This commitment has led to a number 
of initiatives and announcements aiming at strengthening international cooperation and 
assistance, and promoting the need for predictable adequate funding in order to meet the 
goal of a mine-free world by 2025. 
In 2016, mine action donors reiterated their commitments to provide resources to support 
mine action efforts in the coming years through three pledging conferences:3 
  The International Pledging Conference for the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention, hosted by Chile in Geneva in March;
2 Data for 2016 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 
reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2015, UNMAS Annual 
Report 2015, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Sixteen of the 25 States Parties documented in 
this chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2016, 
compared to 13 out of 27 States Parties in 2015. 




























































  The Pledging Conference in support of Iraq, co-hosted by Canada, Japan, Germany, 
Kuwait, the Netherlands, and the US in Washington, DC, in July; and
  The Global Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting, co-hosted by 
Norway and the US in New York City in September.
In addition to these pledging conferences, New Zealand and the US both announced 
significant increases in their funding for clearance and survey efforts in Lao PDR.
In 2017, some donors also renewed their commitment to providing financial resources:
  In February, 36 States Parties, two states not party, the EU, as well as non-governmental 
and international organizations attended the Second Pledging Conference for the 
Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, hosted by Austria in Geneva. In total, 19 
States Parties4 made pledges to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit and 
sponsorship program. 
  In March, Canada pledged new funding to support risk education, clearance, and 
capacity-building activities in Iraq, Ukraine, and Sri Lanka for a combined total of $5.8 
million.5
  In April, the United Kingdom (UK) announced a £100 million ($124 million) aid 
package to support landmine clearance projects in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Somalia, 
and South Sudan over the next three years.6 This represents a tripling in its 
contribution to mine action.7 That same month, the Netherlands also pledged €2 
million (US$2.1 million) for training and the deployment of local demining teams in 
liberated areas of Syria.8
  In November, Germany renewed its support to clearance operations in newly 
liberated areas of Iraq with a contribution of €7 million (some $8 million).9
These pledging conferences and announcements seem to indicate a political commitment 
from some donors to fund mine action in select heavily affected countries in the future. 
But, while an increase has been recorded in mine action funding in 2016, it is too early to 
determine if this will be sustained.
DONORS IN 2016
In 2016, 25 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and four international 
institutions10 contributed a total of $479.5 million to mine action. 
4 Algeria, Australia, Austria, Canada, Belgium, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK). 
Mine Ban Treaty, Second Pledging Conference, 28 February 2017, bit.ly/MBT2ndPledgeConf.
5 Government of Canada, “Canada’s support for demining efforts,” 3 April 2017, www.canada.ca/en/
global-affairs/news/2017/04/canada_s_supportfordeminingefforts.html. Exchange rate for March 2017: 
C$1.3437=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “Foreign Exchange Rates (monthly),” 1 May 2017, www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/g5/20170501/. 
6 Department for International Development (DFID), “UK triples support for action against landmines on 
20th anniversary of Princess Diana’s iconic Angola visit,” Press release, 4 April 2017, bit.ly/UKtriplesMA. 
Average exchange rate for April 2017: £1=US$1.2639. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates 
(Monthly),” 3 July 2017, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/20170703/.
7 In comparison, from 2013–2015 the Landmine Monitor reported that the UK contributed a total of £32.7 
million ($51.3 million).
8 Government of the Netherlands, “Extra support for demining in Syria,” 5 April 2017, www.government.
nl/latest/news/2017/04/05/extra-support-for-demining-in-syria. Average exchange rate for April 2017: 
€1=US$1.0714. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Monthly),” 3 July 2017, www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/g5/20170703/.
9 UNMAS, “The Government of Germany continues to support the clearance of explosive hazards in the 
newly retaken areas of Iraq,” 5 November 2017, www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
UNMAS EN.pdf. Average exchange rate for October 2017: €1=US$1.1755. US Federal Reserve, “List of 
Exchange Rates (Monthly),” 1 November 2017, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/current/default.htm. 
10 South Korea and the US are the two states not party. The four international institutions are the 
Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations Association (UNA)-
Sweden, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
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The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors 
contributing a total of $335.6 million, or 70% of all international funding for 2016. The 
US remained the largest mine action donor with $152.1 million and alone provided about 
one-third of all international mine action support in 2016. The EU ranked second with 
$73.8 million, or 15% of all contributions, while the next three donors—Japan, Germany, and 
Norway—provided more than $30 million each. Another 11 donors contributed less than $1 
million each, compared to 16 in 2015.
Support from States Parties in 2016 accounted for half of all donor funding, with 25 
countries providing some $246 million. This represents an increase from the $190 million 
recorded in 2015.




2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
US 152.1 159.4 113.1 113.4 134.4 672.4
EU 73.8 40.8 66.8 39.6 60.7 281.7
Japan 40.7 49.3 49.1 64.0 57.6 260.7
Germany 37.3 15.2 17.5 22.1 23.8 115.9
Norway 31.7 22.3 41.8 49.6 48.4 193.8
Netherlands 25.2 22.1 25.9 23.4 24.1 120.7
UK 24.9 15.4 13.1 22.8 22.0 98.2
Switzerland 16.6 17.4 18.1 20.6 18.4 91.1
Canada 13.3 10.8 7.7 7.9 6.8 46.5
New Zealand 12.5 3.2 7.5 6.7 5.4 35.3
Australia 11.1 4.1 6.6 14.5 24.0 60.3
Denmark 10.2 9.2 12.1 9.3 8.7 49.5
Sweden 6.5 6.1 7.8 12.9 14.1 47.4
OCHA 4.1 0.4 0 0 0 4.5
Ireland 3.3 3.6 4.5 4.1 3.6 19.1
France 3.2 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 9.7
Belgium 2.9 0.3 3.2 3.1 7.2 16.7
Italy 2.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 2.8 12.3
South Korea 2.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 3.3
Luxembourg 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.2 7.5
Austria 1.1 0.02 0.02 1.2 2.3 4.6
Other donors* 2.4 8.4 11.8 19.6 31.2 73.4
Total 479.5 394.0 411.8 440.4 498.9 2224.6
* Other donors in 2016 included: Andorra, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain, Turkey, the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International 
Development, Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden; OCHA = 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
11 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of 
international support for 2013 was revised to include a contribution from the EU to the Philippines that 
was not previously reported by the Monitor. Totals for 2012 and 2011 have also been rectified as a result 














In 2016, the EU and its member 
states12 contributed a total of $194 
million and accounted for 40% of the 
total international support, up from 
$113.5 million provided in 2015 (33% of 
the total international funding for that 
year). 
Twenty donors contributed more in 
2016 than they did in 2015; including 
a $33 million increase from the EU and 
a $22 million increase from Germany. 
Additionally, Norway, the UK, and New 
Zealand increased their assistance by 
more than $9 million each. Two new 
donors were also identified in 2016: the 
Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and UNA-
Sweden.
In contrast, seven donors decreased 
their funding, led by Japan (down 
$8.6 million) and the US (down $7.3 million). Five donors from 2015 did not report any 
contribution to mine action in 2016: Finland, Lithuania, Council of Europe Development 
Bank (CEB), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP).
Summary of major changes in 2016
Change Donors Combined Total
Increase of more than 
$10 million
Germany, and the EU $55.1 million increase
Increase of less than 
$10 million
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK, OCHA, and OPEC Fund 
for International Development 
$54.1 million increase
New donors in 2016 Sudan Humanitarian Fund and UNA-
Sweden
$0.6 million provided in 
2016
Decrease of more than 
$1 million
Japan and the US $15.8 million decrease
Decrease of less than 
$1 million
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
and Switzerland
$1.8 million decrease
Donors from 2015 that 
did not report new 
support in 2016
Finland, Lithuania, CEB, OSCE, and 
UNDP
$6.7 million provided in 
2015
As shown in the table below, changes in the exchange rates between national currencies 
and the US dollar affected the US dollar value of some contributions. For instance, Japan’s 
contribution dropped by 17% in US dollar terms during 2016, despite decreasing by 26% in 
national currency terms. 
12 Sixteen EU member states provided funding in 2016: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
Iraq’s foreign minister addresses the 2016 
pledging conference hosted in Washington, DC.
© US Department of State, July 2016
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Similarly, whereas Canada, Norway, and the UK reported increases in their mine action 
contributions in 2016, after conversion into US dollars, increases were less pronounced, 
although they remain significant in most instances.



















Australia -A$9.4 million +173% +7 million +170%
Belgium +€2.3 million +867% +2.6 million +865%
Canada +C$3.8 million +27% +2.5 million +23%
Denmark +DKK6.8 million +11% +1 million +11%
EU +€29.9 million +81% +33 million +81%
France +1.9 million +193% +2.1 million +193%
Germany +€20 million +146% +22.1 million +145%
Ireland -€0.3 million -9% -0.4 million -10%
Italy -€0.2 million -9% -0.2 million -7%
Japan -¥1,537 million -26% -8.5 million -17%
Netherlands +€2.9 million +14% +3.1 million 14%
New Zealand -NZ$13.3 million +288 +9.2 million +287%
Norway +NOK86.2 million +48% +9.4 million +42%
Sweden +SEK3.6 million +7% +0.3 million +5%
Switzerland -CHF0.4 million -2% -0.8 million -5%
UK +£8.3 million +83% +9.6 million +62%
FUNDING PATHS
Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known 
as the International Trust Fund).
In 2016, contributions to the VTF totaled $63 million from 21 donors, compared to some 
$52.6 million from 19 donors in 2015.14 Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to 
mine action.15 Seven donors and the OPEC Fund for International Development allocated 
$8.2 million in 2016 through the ITF for mine action programs in nine states and one area, 
as well as for global activities.16
13 Average exchange rates for 2016: A$1=US$0.7445; C$1.3243=US$1; DKK6.7276=US$1; €1=US$1.1096; 
¥108.66=US$1; NZ$0.6976=US$1; NOK8.3936=US$1; £1=US$1.3555; SEK8.5541=US$1; 
and CHF0.9848=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017, 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.
14 UNMAS, “Annual Report 2016,” March 2017, p. 30, www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/
UNMAS_2016_web_1.pdf. 
15 The small donors included Andorra, Liechtenstein, Poland, and OCHA, as well as the Sudan Humanitarian 
Fund and UNA-Sweden.
















A total of 40 states and three other areas received $426.8 million from 31 donors in 2016. A 
further $52.7 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, 
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.
Iraq received the largest amount of funding ($79.7 million) from the largest number of 
donors (16). Eleven states and one area, or 28% of all recipients, had only one donor.17
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The 
top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Croatia, Cambodia, and Lao PDR—received 54% 
of all international support in 2016. 






Iraq 79.7 Myanmar 6.3
Afghanistan 57.3 Dem. Republic of the Congo 6.2
Global 52.7 Yemen 5.3
Croatia 50.7 Zimbabwe 4.9
Cambodia 35.9 Angola 4.8
Lao PDR 35.1 Sri Lanka 4.6
Colombia 26.2 Palestine 4.0
Syria 19.2 Tajikistan 2.2
Lebanon 16.9 Western Sahara 2.0
Vietnam 12.3 Sudan 1.7
Somalia 10.9 Albania 1.5
Ukraine 8.8 Mali 1.4
Libya 7.9 Thailand 1.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 7.4 Other recipients* 6.0
South Sudan 6.5
Total 479.5
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
* Other recipients in 2016 included: Azerbaijan, Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Georgia, Jordan, 
Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, and 
Somaliland. Each received less than $1 million. 
In 2016, 32 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared 
to 2015, including 13 recipients receiving less support and six recipients receiving no new 
support. Croatia was the recipient with the largest increase, receiving $50.7 million more 
than in 2015, following the disbursement of EU funds for clearance activities at the border 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well as a project on mine clearance of agricultural 
17 Albania, Azerbaijan, Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia, Marshall Islands, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, 
Solomon Islands, and other area Somaliland.
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land running until 2020.18 While being the fifth largest recipient of international support in 
2016, Lao PDR was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $7.4 million less than 
in 2015.19 These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities and changes in 
local situations.
While donor funding frequently is used for national activities, implementation is often 
carried out by an array of partnering institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies. 
Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2016 included HALO 
Trust ($25.2 million), Norwegian People’s Aid ($20.6 million), Mines Advisory Group ($20.5 
million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($15.2 million), the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ($10.9 million), DanChurchAid ($10.7 
million), and Handicap International ($10 million).
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR
In 2016, 72% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while 
support to victim assistance represented 4% of the total international support to mine action. 
“Various” funding represented 21% of all international support to mine action. This 
includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked 
for any sectors. 





% of total 
contribution No. of donors
Clearance and risk education 343.2 72% 24
Various 100.4 21% 24
Victim assistance 21.0 4% 15
Capacity-building 12.4 2.5% 15
Advocacy 2.5 0.5% 10
Stockpile destruction 0 0% 0
Total 479.5 100% N/A
Note: N/A = not applicable.
Clearance and risk education
In 2016, $343.2 million, or 72% of all reported support for mine action, went toward 
clearance and risk education activities. This represents an increase of more than $91 million 
from 2015.
18 In 2016, the EU reported contributing a total of €45.8 million ($50.7 million) in mine action funding in 
Croatia: €5.8 million ($6.4 million) for demining activities along the border with BiH, €5 million ($5.6 
million) for a demining program in war affected areas, and €34.9 million ($38.7 million) for a project on 
mine clearance of agricultural land. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, 
Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service, 30 September 2017.
19 The sharp decrease in international support for mine action in Lao PDR in 2016 is the result of changes 
in donors’ contributions, notably Japan which provided less than $600,000 in 2016 (in comparison from 
2012–2015 Japan contributed an average of $12 million annually).
20 In 2015, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education 
($251.6 million, or 64% of total international support), victim assistance ($19.7 million, or 5%), advocacy 
($2.2million, or 0.5%), capacity-building ($6.7 million, or 2%), stockpile destruction ($2.5 million, or 0.5%), 
and various activities ($111.3 million, or 28%). The “0” in stockpile destruction in 2016 does not mean 















Five of the 10 largest donors—the US, the EU, Norway, Germany, and the UK—provided 
nearly three-quarters of all support to clearance and risk education ($256 million). 
Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-two 
donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a 
total of $169.3 million in 31 countries and other areas (19 States Parties, one signatory, nine 
states not party, and two other areas). 
Thirteen donors reported contributions totaling $6 million specifically for risk education projects 
in 11 countries. Myanmar received the most risk education-specific funding with $1.4 million. 
Victim assistance
Direct international support for victim assistance activities remained below the level of most 
previous years, and decreased significantly as a percentage of total mine action funding. 
Based on information available as of November 2017, in 2016, $21 million was reported, up 
slightly from $19.7 million in 2015. This represents just 4% of all reported support for mine 
action, compared to some 5% or 6% in 2015, 2014, and 2013. 
Fifteen21 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in nine States Parties, 
five states not party, and one other area.22 Most mine-affected countries did not receive any 
direct international support for victim assistance. Funding for victim assistance activities, 
however, is especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support 
for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons 
with disabilities. Since such contributions are not disaggregated, it is not possible to include 
them in Monitor reporting.
The top three victim assistance donors—Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland—
provided 64% ($13.5 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2016. 
Nine donors reported contributing $13.3 million, half of all support to victim assistance 
in 2016, through the ICRC or national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. 
Advocacy & capacity-building
In 2016, less than 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities 
($2.5 million). Of the 32 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 10 
reported supporting advocacy activities.
Ten donors provided $12.4 million—2.5% of all international support—to support 
capacity-building activities in eight States Parties, and three states not party. 
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2016
While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions 
to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in 
their annual Article 7 reports.23 States Parties such as Algeria24 and Iraq, as well as states not 
party India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination 
and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported 
annual expenditures. 
21 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the OFID. Data for 2015 
was also revised—based on new figures that no longer detailed dedicated victim assistance funding—
resulting in a decrease from the $24.2 million recorded in Landmine Monitor 2016. 
22 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that received 
international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, and Vietnam. 
Kosovo was the sole other area that received victim assistance funding. 
23 Only four of the 11 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in 
a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2016: Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
24 Algeria reported completion of mine clearance in 2017.
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Eleven affected states reported $85.0 
million in contributions to mine action 
from their national budget in 2016, $46.2 
million less than the $131.2 million 
reported in 2015 (a 35% decrease).25 As in 
2015, this decrease is largely the result of 
less support provided by Angola to its mine 
action program, with a total contribution 
amounting to $24.5 million in 2016 (60% 
less than the $60 million provided in 2015). 
Nevertheless, Angola still accounted for 
approximately 30% of all national funding 
for 2016. 
In 2016, three states completely funded 
their own mine action program: Chile, 
Ecuador, and Mauritania. Additionally, three 
States Parties reported funding more than 
half of their own mine action programs: BiH 
(59% of total program cost), Chad (97%), and 
Sudan (54%).
FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION  
2012–2016
Over the past five years (2012–2016), total support to mine action amounted to some $3 
billion, an average of about $603 million per year. 
Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted 
for about one-quarter of total mine action funding over the period, and amounted to 
approximately $794.8 million. 
International support totaled $2.2 billion, an average of $445 million per year, and 
represented 74% of all support. Three donors—the US, the EU, and Japan—contributed $1.2 
billion, more than 50% of total international support. Three other donors—Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Germany—contributed more than $100 million each. Support from States 
Parties accounted for 55% of all international funding with $1.2 billion provided.
Between 2012–2016, the top four recipients—Afghanistan ($310.2 million), Iraq ($234.8 
million), Lao PDR ($192 million), and Cambodia ($148.7 million)—received 40% of all 
international contributions. 
Summary of contributions: 2012–2016
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Marta Maurás, the chair of the 15th Meeting of States Parties, takes questions from the 
media during a trip for delegates to demonstrate mine issues in northern Chile.















STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION
1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION  
(1997 MINE BAN TREATY)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into 
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second 
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign 
rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as 
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has 
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 30 November 2017 there were 162 States Parties.  
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
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Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Dem Rep of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a) 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00 
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00 















Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 
   1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
SIGNATORY







































CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated 
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the 
world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, 
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important 
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the 
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced 
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end 
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around 
the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally 
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, 
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all 
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 















Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on 
the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1.  Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or 
indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under this Convention.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1.  “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel 
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2.  “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a 
vehicle.
3.  “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, 
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4.  “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into 
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not 
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.




1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a 
number of anti- personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall 
not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
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ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its 
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall 
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein 
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit 
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of 
all the anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration 
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
















International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek 
and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose 
undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes.
3.   Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, 
international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International 
Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance 
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with 
demining. 
5.  Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of 
stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6.  Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various 
means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7.  States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties 
or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in 
the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementa-
tion of the program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the rel-
evant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall 





1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon 
as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot 
numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 
contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as 
possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined 
area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or 
transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine 
destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institu-
tions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance 
with Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 
production facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the 
location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of 
anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, 
if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in 
accordance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent 
known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably 
possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of 
anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may 
facilitate mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in 
relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States 
Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to 
the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of 
















2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter 
to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. 
Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken 
to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, 
to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her 
good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal 
and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a 
request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for 
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such 
communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States 
Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of 
States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case 
may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by 
consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this 
decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including 
any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a 
majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a 
mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places 
directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the 
requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties 
and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded 
as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance 
in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding 
missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to 
such missions.
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10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of 
the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with 
the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be 
appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges 
and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the 
territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party 
shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the 
mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum 
extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding 
mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment 
which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. 
Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it 
intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission 
is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas 
and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be 
expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State 
Party considers necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have 
with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no 
more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-
finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the 
results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider 
all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a 
specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response 
to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may 
suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the 
matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity 
with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, 
including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, 

















Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including 
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 




1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State 
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by 
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the 
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and 
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent 
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to 
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be 
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States 
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Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five 
years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties 
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this 
Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated 
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a 
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an 
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held 
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of 
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall 
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this 
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments 
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any 
remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14 
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States 
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the 
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 

















This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature 
at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. 
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month 
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been 
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it 
will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.
ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw 
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the 
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument 
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect 
before the end of the armed conflict.
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4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the 








The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

